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Abstract
This paper proposes a trade model with heterogeneous ﬁrms that decide not just
whether and how much to export but also whether and how much to innovate. In-
corporating both the extensive and intensive margins of trade and innovation leads to
diﬀerent possible equilibria. Depending on how costly trade is relative to innovation,
medium-productivity ﬁrms may either export without innovating, innovate without
exporting, do both or do neither. The impact of trade on aggregate productivity
and welfare depends crucially on the equilibrium the economy is in. When lowering
the variable costs of trade, the welfare eﬀects arising from reallocating market shares
across ﬁrms may be non-negligible, and when lowering the ﬁxed cost of trade, aggregate
productivity need not always increase. After calibrating the model to ﬁve European
countries, we show that the diﬀerent equilibria are plausible, and provide quantitative
evidence that supports the predictions of our theory.
JEL Codes: F12, F14, O24, O31
Keywords: Process Innovation, Firm Heterogeneity, Trade Policy
∗I gratefully acknowledge my advisor Klaus Desmet for his valuable advice, guidance and support. I
would also like to thank Loris Rubini for his insightful comments throughout the development of the paper.
I also thank Costas Arkolakis, Stephen Parente, the seminar participants in the UC3M Workshops, in the
Yale International Trade Workshop, XVII Dynamic Macroeconomics Workshop in Vigo, XIII Conference
in International Economics in Granada and 14th ETSG Conference in Leuven for their comments that
greatly improved both the content and exposition of the paper. Part of this research was conducted during
my stays at the economic departments of University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Yale University,
and I am grateful for the hospitality enjoyed there. All mistakes are my own. Financial support from the
European Commission (EFIGE grant 225551) is gratefully acknowledged.
†Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. E-mail: acrodrig@eco.uc3m.es
1
1 Introduction
There is substantial heterogeneity across ﬁrms in both innovation and export activities.
Some ﬁrms neither innovate nor export, others both innovate and exports, and still others
may do one of the activities without the other. In addition, within these diﬀerent groups of
ﬁrms, the intensity of both activities also diﬀers across ﬁrms. While the literature has long
recognized the interdependence between innovation and trade, it has so far not analyzed
the impact of trade liberalization on productivity and welfare in a model that incorporates
both the extensive and the intensive margins of both trade and innovation.
The main point of the paper is to show that introducing these diﬀerent margins is
key for understanding the impact of trade liberalization. Diﬀerent equilibria may arise,
depending on the relative costs of trade and innovation. After theoretically discussing the
properties of each of those equilibria, we show that they are quantitatively plausible by
calibrating the model to ﬁve European countries. I then show that the impact of trade
liberalization depends crucially on the equilibrium the economy is in and the nature of the
liberalization. For example, in the case of a drop in variable trade costs, this paper shows
that the eﬀects on welfare from changes in ﬁrms’ decisions to export and innovate may be
non-negligible, in contrast to the literature.1 As another example, a drop in the ﬁxed cost
of trade need not always have a positive eﬀect on aggregate productivity. Indeed, in an
economy in which many ﬁrms export, but few ﬁrms innovate, lowering the ﬁxed cost of
trade, by increasing the number of exporters, may make innovating more expensive, thus
lowering aggregate productivity.
The paper proposes a trade model with heterogeneous ﬁrms in the spirit of Melitz
(2003) with a basic diﬀerence: once a ﬁrm learns about its productivity, it can decide to
spend resources on innovation to lower its marginal costs. Innovation is a costly activity
that involves both ﬁxed and variable costs, hence ﬁrms decide not only whether to innovate
but also how much to innovate. This is key to be able to explore how trade liberalization
aﬀects the extensive and intensive margin of innovation. The model is rich enough to
explore the interdependence between the innovation and the export decisions, and yet
tractable enough to aggregate up from ﬁrm level decisions and analyze how aggregate
productivity and welfare respond to changes in trade and innovation policies.
Three diﬀerent equilibria may arise, depending on how costly trade is relative to innova-
tion. In all three equilibria, high-productivity ﬁrms always export and innovate, while low-
1See Arkolakis et al. (2012) and Atkeson and Burstein (2010) on this topic.
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productivity ﬁrms never export or innovate. What diﬀers across equilibria is the behavior
of medium-productivity ﬁrms. In the low cost innovation equilibrium, trade is relatively
costly compared to innovation, so that medium-productivity ﬁrms innovate, but do not
export. In the low cost trade equilibrium, trade costs are relatively low compared to inno-
vation, so that medium-productivity ﬁrms export, but do not innovate. In between these
two extremes, there is the intermediate equilibrium, characterized by medium-productivity
ﬁrms engaging in either both activities or none of them. Depending on which equilibrium
the economy is in, the theory illustrates that the eﬀect of trade liberalization on aggregate
productivity and welfare may be very diﬀerent.
To assess the plausibility of the theory, we calibrate the model to ﬁve European coun-
tries. In particular, the model is calibrated to match a number of salient features of
innovation, ﬁrm size distribution and international trade in France, Germany, Italy, Spain
and United Kingdom, using the ﬁrm-level data set European Firms in a Global Economy
(EFIGE). The survey, conducted during the year 2009, is representative of the manufac-
turing sector in each country. Especially relevant for our analysis is the information on
employment, internationalization and innovation. A ﬁrst result is that the diﬀerent equili-
bria are not only theoretically relevant, but also empirically plausible: diﬀerent countries
are in diﬀerent equilibria. This is important, since the theory predicts that the eﬀect of
trade liberalization on aggregate productivity and welfare depends crucially on the equi-
librium a country is in.
A ﬁrst quantitative exercise consists of quantifying the eﬀect of a reduction in variable
trade costs on aggregate productivity. The analysis is based on the ideal measure of
aggregate productivity deﬁned by Atkeson and Burstein (2010). I focus on this measure,
because it captures the productivity that is relevant for welfare. Apart from the direct cost
savings eﬀects of a drop in variable trade costs, the theory predicts that there are a number
of indirect eﬀects. First, it induces the exit of less productive ﬁrms and the reallocation of
market shares towards the more productive ﬁrms. This is the selection eﬀect described in
Melitz (2003). Second, the innovation intensity increases with the participation in foreign
markets, so the eﬀect through the intensive margin of innovation should be positive2.
Third, the theory predicts that the eﬀect through the extensive margin of innovation can
be positive or negative. In the low cost trade equilibrium and the intermediate equilibrium,
2Despite the intensity of innovation from domestic ﬁrms decreasing (if there are in the economy), the
increase on the intensity of innovation of exporter ﬁrms ensures that the ﬁnal eﬀect through the intensive
margin is positive.
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all innovators are exporting. In that case a decrease in variable trade costs increases the
incentives to be an exporter (and to be an exporter innovator), so that the eﬀect through
the extensive margin of innovation is positive. In contrast, in the low cost innovation
equilibrium, some of the innovators do not export. In that case, a drop in trade costs
makes it harder for domestic ﬁrms to innovate, so that the eﬀect through the extensive
margin of innovation is negative.
My ﬁndings corroborate the theoretical predictions. In particular, in most countries
the eﬀect of a drop in variable trade costs on aggregate productivity through the extensive
margin is positive, except in those that are in the low cost innovation equilibrium, where the
eﬀect is negative. My ﬁndings also shed new light on which channels matter when analyzing
the impact of trade liberalization on aggregate productivity. Work by Atkeson and Burstein
(2010) has suggested that the indirect eﬀects of trade liberalization on productivity are
negligible. That is, liberalizing trade improves productivity through the standard direct
eﬀect of saving resources on trade, whereas the indirect eﬀects coming from changes in
ﬁrms’ decisions related to exit, trade and innovation are essentially zero. In contrast, our
ﬁndings show that this depends crucially on the equilibrium an economy is in. While in
most countries the indirect eﬀects are indeed negligible, this is not the case of countries in
the low cost innovation equilibrium. This underscores the importance of having a model
that encompasses both the extensive and intensive margins of trade and innovation.
A second quantitative exercise focuses on the eﬀectiveness to increase productivity
of lowering the ﬁxed costs of trade or innovation. While our ﬁrst exercises focused on a
reduction in variable trade costs, we now show that a reduction in ﬁxed trade or innovation
costs may also have very diﬀerent eﬀects, depending on the equilibrium the economy is in.
While in general the eﬀect of lowering the ﬁxed cost of trade is positive, we ﬁnd that in the
low cost trade equilibrium it is negative. The intuition is as follows. In such equilibrium,
there are many exporters, but only the most productive innovate. Since all innovators
are also exporters, by increasing the incentives to enter the export market, a drop in the
ﬁxed costs of trade pushes up real wages, reducing the incentives to innovate. As a result,
both the number of innovators and the intensity of the remaining innovators decline, which
translates in the ﬁnal eﬀect on welfare being negative.
The simulations reveal that a non-inﬁnitesimal drop in ﬁxed trade costs, can induce
productivity gains from 1% to 20% in total, and only if the economy is already very open
(in the low cost trade equilibrium) might a further drop in ﬁxed trade costs be damaging
to the economy, which suggest that a ﬁxed trade cost liberalization does not have the same
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nature than a variable trade cost liberalization. In contrast to a ﬁxed trade cost reduction,
a ﬁxed innovation cost drop has little eﬀect on the productivity, the maximum increase
being around 2%, and has far more damaging eﬀects if it induces economies to be less
export oriented, since then the productivity might decrease by up to 7%.
This paper is related to diﬀerent strands of the literature. On the one hand, there is
the literature that focuses on how ﬁrms make joint decisions on exporting and innovating.
Yeaple (2005) and Bustos (2011) consider models in which there is a binary technology
choice, and highlight how ﬁrms decide to both enter the export market and adopt the new
technology. The cost of innovation is therefore modeled as a ﬁxed cost. Costantini and
Melitz (2008) extend this type of joint decision to a dynamic framework where ﬁrms face
both idiosyncratic uncertainty and sunk costs for both exporting and technology adoption.
On the other hand, there is the literature that focuses on examining the impact of trade on
the intensity of innovation. Vannoorenberghe (2008) and Rubini (2011) consider models
in which ﬁrm productivity is endogenously determined through innovation, and highlight
that innovation is aﬀected by the existence of foreign markets. Closely related to these is
the work of Atkeson and Burstein (2010). They propose a dynamic trade model to include
a process innovation decision by incumbent ﬁrms following Griliches (1979)’s model of
knowledge capital.
A key contribution of my work is joining the two branches of the literature on trade and
innovation. While my model abstracts from the dynamics, it explores quantitatively the
responses of ﬁrms along both the extensive and intensive margins of innovation to changes
in the environment. My results echoe those of Atkeson and Burstein (2010) in that welfare
gains from trade do not depend on how a change in variable trade costs aﬀects ﬁrms’ exit,
export and innovation decisions, if the extensive margin of innovation is not aﬀected by
the policy. At the same time, my result complements theirs by explaining carefully how
a negative incentive to innovate, driven by a drop in variable trade costs, actually implies
that ﬁrms’ exit, export and innovation decisions can have an impact on welfare gains.
Finally, my work here is also related to a large literature on the aggregate implications
of trade liberalization. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) study a variant of Melitz’s
model that features endogenous growth through spillovers. They show that depending on
the nature of the spillovers, a reduction in international trade costs can increase or decrease
growth through changes in product innovation. My model centers on process innovation
and abstracts from such spillovers. Arkolakis et al. (2012) calculate the welfare gains from
trade in a wide class of trade models, including Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003) models
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with Pareto productivities. The main diﬀerences between this paper and mine is that they
abstract from innovation and focus only on changes in marginal trade costs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the model of the economy
where ﬁrms take decisions on innovation and exporting. In Section 3, I explore the equilibria
determined by the interaction between the exporting and innovation choices creates. In
Section 4, I calibrate the model to match ﬁve main European economies. In Section 5, I
analyze the eﬀects in aggregate productivity and welfare of a drop in variable trade costs,
a drop in ﬁxed trade cost and a drop in ﬁxed innovation costs. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The model is based on the monopolistic competition framework proposed by Melitz (2003).
I consider a symmetric n+1 country world, each of which uses a single factor of production
(labor L) to produce goods. In contrast to Melitz (2003), the model allows these ﬁrms to
have the opportunity to engage in process innovation.
2.1 Demand
I denote the source country by i and the destination country by j, where i, j = 1, ..., n+1.
In each country j, there is a continuum of consumers of measure Lj . Given the set Ω of
varieties supplied to the market, the consumer’s preferences of country j are represented
by the standard C.E.S. utility function
[∫
ω∈Ω
qρij(ω)dω
] 1
ρ
where qij(ω) denotes the quantity consumed of variety ω produced by ﬁrm i in country j
and σ = 11−ρ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The market is subject to
the expenditure-income constraint:∫
ω∈Ω
pij(ω)qij(ω)dω = Rj
where Rj is the total revenues obtained in country j.
Then standard utility maximization implies that the demand for each individual variety
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will be:
qij(ω) = [pij(ω)]
−σ Rj
P 1−σj
(1)
where pij(ω) is the price of each variety ω and Pj =
[∫
ω∈Ω pij(ω)
1−σdω
] 1
1−σ denotes the
price index of the economy.
2.2 Supply
There is a continuum of ﬁrms, each producing a diﬀerent variety ω. Each ﬁrm draws its
productivity ϕ from a distribution G (ϕ) with support (0,∞) after paying a labor sunk
cost of entry fE . Since a ﬁrm is characterized by its productivity ϕ, it is equivalent to talk
about variety ω or productivity ϕ.
Production requires only labor, which is inelastically supplied at its aggregate level Lj ,
and therefore can be taken as an index of country’s j size. In contrast to the Melitz model
where ﬁrms use a constant returns to scale production technology, ﬁrms can aﬀect their
marginal cost through process innovation. To enter country j, ﬁrm i needs fij > 0 labor
units and I make the standard iceberg cost assumption that τij > 1 units of the good have
to be produced by ﬁrm i to deliver one unit to country j. Without loss of generality, I
assume that τii = 1 and thus I denote τij = τ ∀i = j.3 Therefore, to produce output
qij (ϕ) , a ﬁrm requires lij (ϕ) labor units
lij (ϕ) = fij + c (z(ϕ)) +
qij(ϕ)
ϕ
τij
(1 + z(ϕ))
1
σ−1
where z(ϕ) is a measure of the productivity increase from innovation that has an associated
cost function c (z(ϕ)).
The cost function of the innovation follows Klette and Kortum (2004), Lentz and
Mortensen (2008) and Sta¨hler et al. (2007). Firms pay a ﬁxed cost, that can be attributed
to the acquisition and implementation of the technology, plus a variable cost that depends
directly on the process innovation performed by each ﬁrm. Hence the cost function c (zi)
is deﬁned as
c(z(ϕ)) =
{
z(ϕ)α+1 + fI if z(ϕ) > 0
0 if z(ϕ) = 0
where fI is the ﬁxed cost required to implement the process innovation and α > 0 measures
3Note that τij = τji by symmetry and there is no possibility of transportation arbitrage
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the rate at which the marginal cost of the innovation increases. Thus, the higher the level
of innovation, the higher the cost associated with marginal increases.
Even though it can be argued that the cost of innovation can be simpliﬁed by imposing
a linear variable cost, the existence of convex innovation costs is a standard feature in the
literature and ensures that innovation is ﬁnite. Another simpliﬁcation would be to have
either a ﬁxed cost or a variable cost but not both. Nevertheless maintaining a ﬂexible
cost function is important. For example, Vannoorenberghe (2008) assumes away a ﬁxed
innovation cost, which implies that all ﬁrms engage in process innovation. This eliminates
the possibility of studying the interaction between the export and innovation decisions
along the extensive margin, which is one of the purposes of this paper.
2.3 Firm’s problem
Exit Market
Charge price pD
fE
Charge price pDI
Enter Market
fD
Charge price pX
Charge price pXI
Figure 1: Timing
Figure 1 represents the timing of the ﬁrm’s problem. In a ﬁrst stage, as in Melitz (2003),
entering the market means paying a labor sunk cost fE , in order to get a draw of the pro-
ductivity parameter ϕ. In the second stage, with the knowledge of their own productivity,
ﬁrms decide which activities to undertake. Since both exporting and innovation require
paying a labor ﬁxed cost, fX and fI respectively, there will be four types of ﬁrms in the
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open economy. Type D ﬁrms are only active in the domestic market and do not perform
innovation; Type DI ﬁrms are those active only in the domestic market that innovate; Type
X ﬁrms are those active in both the domestic and the foreign market that do not perform
any innovation; and Type XI ﬁrms are active in the domestic and foreign markets that
engage in innovation activities. Finally, in the third stage, ﬁrms decide prices. Given the
timing, I solve the ﬁrms problem through backward induction.
Optimal Pricing Rule. In the last stage of the problem the ﬁrm sets its optimal price,
given its innovation decision and the market conditions which are summarized by the price
index Pj and Rj .
max
pij(ϕ)
pij (ϕ) qij (ϕ)− fij − τijqij (ϕ)
ϕ
[
(1 + zi)
1
σ−1
] − c (zi)
The corresponding ﬁrst order condition is
pij (ϕ) =
(
σ
σ − 1
)
τij
ϕ
· 1
(1 + zi)
1
σ−1
∀ z (2)
Optimal Innovation Decision. The returns of process innovation increase with the
participation in more countries. Thus, the optimal innovation rule for ﬁrm i is obtained
from the ﬁrst order condition of the maximization of
∑
j πij (ϕ) =
∑
j [pij(ϕ)qij(ϕ)− lij(ϕ)]
with respect to zi, provided that the ﬁrm makes higher proﬁts by innovating than by
choosing not to innovate. This gives
zi(ϕ) =
⎧⎨⎩
[
1 + nτ1−σ
] 1
α
[
1
α+1
(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1
] 1
α
if
∑
j π
I
ij(ϕ) ≥
∑
j π
NI
ij (ϕ)
0 if
∑
j π
I
ij(ϕ) <
∑
j π
NI
ij (ϕ)
(3)
where 1α is the parameter that shapes the optimal innovation function and tells us how
innovation rises with size, where I take the productivity parameter ϕσ−1 to be the indicator
of size. If the function is linear (α = 1), then innovation rises proportionately with size,
however, if the function is concave (α > 1), then the amount of innovation performed will
rise less than proportionally with size, and if the function is convex (0 < α < 1) the amount
of innovation performed will increase more than proportionally with the productivity.
To make the joint decision of whether to enter the foreign markets and whether to
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innovate or not, ﬁrms will choose the option that yields the highest proﬁts. Since countries
are symmetric we can drop the subscripts and classify ﬁrms in four types.
  Proﬁts of a domestic non-innovator ﬁrm (Type D):
πD =
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1 − fD
  Proﬁts of a domestic innovator ﬁrm (Type DI):
πDI =
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1 (1 + zD (ϕ))− fD − c (zD (ϕ))
  Proﬁts of an exporter non-innovator ﬁrm (Type X):
πX =
(
1 + nτ1−σ
) R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1 − nfX − fD
  Proﬁts of an exporter innovator ﬁrm (Type XI):
πXI =
(
1 + nτ1−σ
) R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1 (1 + zX (ϕ))− nfX − fD − c (zX (ϕ))
where fD = fii, fX = fij = fji ∀j = i, zD(ϕ) =
[
1
α+1
(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1
] 1
α
, and zX(ϕ) =[
1 + nτ1−σ
] 1
α
[
1
α+1
(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1
] 1
α
.
3 Equilibrium
There will be three diﬀerent equilibria that will cover the whole parameter space. First,
the low-cost innovation equilibrium, where the activity of exporting is relatively costly in
comparison to innovation, and therefore only the most productive ﬁrms will carry out both
activities, middle productivity ﬁrms will innovate but not export and the lower productivity
ﬁrms will neither innovate nor export. Second, the low-cost trade equilibrium, where the
activity of innovation is relatively costly in comparison to exporting and therefore only the
most productive ﬁrms will carry out both activities, middle productivity ﬁrms will export
but not engage in innovation and the lower productivity ﬁrms will neither innovate nor
export. Thirdly, between these two equilibria there will be the intermediate equilibrium
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where ﬁrms are either very productive and can undertake both activities or do not perform
any of them.
The existence of these three equilibria is consistent with the empirical evidence found
both in the trade and the innovation literature. Costantini and Melitz (2008) suggest
that exporting and innovation are performed by the most productive ﬁrms while domestic
producers are typically less innovative and less productive, a feature common to all the
equilibria. Vives (2008) provides intuition for the decisions taken by middle productivity
ﬁrms in each equilibrium. If trade costs are relatively high, middle productivity ﬁrms are
domestic innovators because being an exporter without innovating is not proﬁtable. A
decrease in trade costs attracts the most productive ﬁrms from the foreign country, dis-
couraging middle productivity domestic ﬁrms to undertake innovation. The disappearance
of domestic innovators as trade costs fall can be explained by this Schumpeterian eﬀect
and is also predicted by the dynamic model of Costantini and Melitz (2008). However, a
fall in trade costs enables more ﬁrms to participate actively in both markets which explains
the existence of exporter non-innovators when trade costs are low enough.
Diﬀerent theoretical papers have identiﬁed these equilibria separately, but never all
in a single model. Bustos (2011) identiﬁes the equilibrium where there are no domestic
innovators ﬁrms since it is an unproﬁtable choice. In Vannoorenberghe (2008) all ﬁrms
innovate, therefore it is not possible to study the interaction between both decisions. Fi-
nally, Navas-Ruiz and Sala (2007) identify the two extreme equilibria, but fail to identify
the intermediate equilibrium. The main contribution of the theoretical model is the identi-
ﬁcation of all the equilibria with the ability to study the transitions between them and the
possible productivity gains that might occur through the intensive and extensive margins
of innovation. In the numerical section I will analyze whether these diﬀerent equilibria
are relevant when calibrating the model to diﬀerent European countries. In what follows
I describe each of the equilibria, the eﬀects that trade has on innovation in each case, the
parameter restrictions that give rise to the diﬀerent equilibria, and conclude by focusing
on the interaction between exporting and innovation.
3.1 Low Cost Innovation Equilibrium
The low cost innovation equilibrium is characterized by exporting being less attractive
than innovation. In Figure 2, I depict the proﬁts of all types of ﬁrms as a function of
productivity when trade costs are relatively high in comparison to innovation costs. The
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envelope line shows the type of ﬁrm that will be chosen by a ﬁrm with productivity ϕ as
it maximizes proﬁts. In this equilibrium, the least productive ﬁrms (ϕ < ϕD) exit, the low
productivity ﬁrms (ϕD < ϕ < ϕDI) are active in the domestic market but do not innovate
or export, middle productivity ﬁrms (ϕDI < ϕ < ϕXI) are active only on the domestic
market but innovate, and the most productive ﬁrms (ϕ > ϕXI) are active both in the
domestic and export market, and innovate. Note that there is no range of productivity
level where exporting without innovating is proﬁtable, that is, the marginal exporter is an
innovator as well.
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Figure 2: Low Cost Innovation Selection Path
The conditions of entry in the domestic and export markets plus the innovation condi-
tion allow to solve for the diﬀerent productivity cutoﬀs in the low cost innovation equili-
brium.
The Zero Proﬁt Condition (ZPC) in the domestic market is πD (ϕ
∗
D) = 0, so that:
(ϕ∗D)
σ−1 =
fD(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
) (4)
The Innovation Proﬁt Condition (IPC) determines the productivity cutoﬀ ϕ∗DI which
is the productivity of the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between innovating or not while operating only
on the domestic market, i.e. πDI (ϕ
∗
DI) = πD (ϕ
∗
DI) , so that:
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(ϕ∗DI)
σ−1 =
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
) (5)
The Innovation Export Proﬁt Condition (IXPC) determines the exporting-innovation
cutoﬀ ϕ∗XI which is the productivity of an innovating ﬁrm indiﬀerent between participating
also on the exporting market or not:
πXI (ϕXI)− πDI (ϕXI) = 0 (6)
The following proposition shows for which part of the parameter space the low cost
innovation equilibrium exists.
Proposition 1.
The economy is in the low cost innovation equilibrium, ϕ∗XI > ϕ
∗
DI > ϕ
∗
D, if the
following parameter restrictions hold
1. τσ−1fX ≥
[
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α −1
]
nτ1−σ fI +
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)
2.
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) ≥ fD
Proof. The formal proof can be found in the Appendix A. The proof is divided in two
parts. First I show that there exist a single solution to equation (6). The non linearity
present in the optimal innovation decision is the source of the complexity of ﬁnding a closed
form for the cutoﬀ ϕ∗XI . Nevertheless, I show that selection into exporting and innovation
(ϕ∗XI > ϕ
∗
DI) requires that condition 1 of Proposition 1 holds, that is exporting costs should
be high enough relative to innovation costs. Notice that condition 2 of Proposition 1 ensures
that there is selection into innovation (ϕ∗DI > ϕ
∗
D). Secondly, I show that equations (4)
to (6) along with the Free Entry (FE) condition, which requires that the sunk entry cost
equals the present value of expected proﬁts:
1
δ
[∫ ϕ∗DI
ϕ∗D
πD (ϕ) dG (ϕ) +
∫ ϕ∗XI
ϕ∗DI
πDI (ϕ) dG (ϕ) +
∫ ∞
ϕ∗XI
πXI (ϕ) dG (ϕ)
]
= fE (7)
uniquely determine the equilibrium price (P ) , the number of ﬁrms (M) and the distri-
bution of active ﬁrms productivity in the economy along with the productivity cutoﬀs
ϕ∗D, ϕ
∗
DI and ϕ
∗
XI .
13
3.2 Low Cost Trade Equilibrium
The low cost trade equilibrium is characterized by exporting being more attractive than
innovation. In Figure 3 , I depict the proﬁts of all types of ﬁrms as a function of productivity
when trade costs are relatively low in comparison to innovation costs. The envelope line
shows the type of ﬁrm that will be chosen by a ﬁrm with productivity ϕ as it maximizes
proﬁts. In this equilibrium, the least productive ﬁrms (ϕ < ϕD) exit, the low productivity
ﬁrms (ϕD < ϕ < ϕDI) are active in the domestic market but do not innovate or export,
middle productivity ﬁrms (ϕDI < ϕ < ϕXI) are active only on the domestic market but
innovate, and the most productive ﬁrms (ϕ > ϕXI) are active both in the domestic and
export market, and innovate. Note that there is no range of productivity level where
innovation without exporting is proﬁtable, that is, the marginal innovator is an exporter.
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Figure 3: Low Cost Trade Selection Path
The conditions of entry in the domestic and export markets, plus the innovation con-
ditions, allow to solve the diﬀerent productivity cutoﬀs in the low cost trade equilibrium.
The Zero Proﬁt Condition (ZPC) in the domestic market4 is πD (ϕ
∗
D) = 0 so that:
(ϕ∗D)
σ−1 =
fD(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
) (8)
4The ZPC condition is deﬁned theoretically in the same way in every equilibrium. However, since the
aggregates in each situation are diﬀerent, the entry cutoﬀ will also be diﬀerent.
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The Exporting Proﬁt Condition (XPC) determines the exporting-entry productivity
cutoﬀ ϕ∗X which is the productivity of the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between staying in the domestic
market and participating in the export market, i.e. πX (ϕ
∗
X) = πD (ϕ
∗
X):
(ϕ∗X)
σ−1 =
fX(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
τ1−σ
(9)
The Exporting Innovation Proﬁt Condition (XIPC) determines the innovation expor-
ting productivity cutoﬀ ϕ∗XI , which is the productivity of an exporting ﬁrm indiﬀerent
between innovating or not, i.e. πXI (ϕ
∗
XI) = πX (ϕ
∗
XI):
(ϕ∗XI)
σ−1 =
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
(1 + nτ1−σ)
(10)
The following proposition shows for which part of the parameter space the low cost
trade equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2.
The economy is in the low cost trade equilibrium, ϕ∗XI > ϕ
∗
X > ϕ
∗
D, if the following
parameter restrictions hold
(
fI
α
) αα+1
(α+ 1)
(1 + nτ1−σ)
≥ τσ−1fX ≥ fD
Proof. Selection into exporting and innovation (ϕ∗XI > ϕ
∗
X) requires innovation costs to be
high enough relative to trade costs and selection into exporting (ϕ∗X > ϕ
∗
D) requires trade
costs to be high enough relative to production costs. Equations (8) to (10) along with
the Free Entry (FE) condition, which requires that the sunk entry cost equals the present
value of expected proﬁts:
1
δ
[∫ ϕ∗X
ϕ∗D
πD (ϕ) dG (ϕ) +
∫ ϕ∗XI
ϕ∗X
πX (ϕ) dG (ϕ) +
∫ ∞
ϕ∗XI
πXI (ϕ) dG (ϕ)
]
= fE (11)
uniquely determine the equilibrium price (P ) , the number of ﬁrms (M) and the distri-
bution of active ﬁrms productivity in the economy along with the productivity cutoﬀs
ϕ∗XI , ϕ
∗
X and ϕ
∗
D. See Appendix B for a formal proof.
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3.3 Intermediate Equilibrium
The intermediate equilibrium is characterized by exporting and innovation being relatively
equally attractive. In Figure 4, I depict the proﬁts of all types of ﬁrms as a function
of productivity when trade costs are neither very high nor very low in comparison to
innovation costs. The envelope line shows the type of ﬁrm that will be chosen by a ﬁrm
with productivity ϕ as it maximizes proﬁts. In this equilibrium, the least productive ﬁrms
(ϕ < ϕD) exit, the low productivity ﬁrms (ϕD < ϕ < ϕXI) are active in the domestic
market but do not innovate or export, and the most productive ﬁrms (ϕ > ϕXI) are active
both in the domestic and export market, and innovate. Note that there is no range of
productivity level where exporting without innovating or innovating without exporting is
proﬁtable, that is, the marginal exporter is an innovator as well.
ProfitsTypeD
ProfitsTypeDI
P fit T X
Profits
ro s ype
ProfitsTypeXI
TypeD
#REF!
fD

fD
f f D X
fDfX
D XIExit Type D Type XI
Figure 4: Intermediate Selection Path
The conditions of entry in the domestic markets, plus the innovation and export con-
dition, allow to solve the diﬀerent productivity cutoﬀs in the intermediate equilibrium.
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The Zero Proﬁt Condition (ZPC) in the domestic market5 is πD (ϕ
∗
D) = 0 so that:
(ϕ∗D)
σ−1 =
fD(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
) (12)
The Exporting Innovation Proﬁt Condition (XIPC) determines the innovation expor-
ting productivity cutoﬀ ϕ∗XI , which is the productivity of a ﬁrm indiﬀerent between ex-
porting and innovating or not.
πXI (ϕ
∗
XI)− πD (ϕ∗XI) = 0 (13)
The following proposition shows for which part of the parameter space the intermediate
equilibrium exists.
Proposition 3.
The economy is in the intermediate equilibrium, ϕ∗XI > ϕ
∗
D, if the following parameter
restrictions hold
1.
[
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α −1
]
nτ1−σ fI +
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) ≥ τσ−1fX
2. τσ−1fX ≥
(
fI
α
) αα+1
(α+1)
(1+nτ1−σ)
3.
(
fI
α
) αα+1
(α+1)
(1+nτ1−σ) ≥ fD
Proof. If the ﬁrst parameter restriction does not hold, then for some ﬁrms is proﬁtable to
innovate without exporting. If the second parameter restriction does not hold, then for
some ﬁrms is proﬁtable to export without innovating. Therefore, the trade costs must be in
between the limits of innovation, so that ﬁrms either export and innovate or simply remain
in the domestic market. The non linearity present in the optimal innovation decision is the
source of the complexity of ﬁnding a closed form for the cutoﬀ ϕ∗XI , nevertheless I show
that conditions 1 and 2 hold. Furthermore, I show that Equations (12) and (13) along
with the Free Entry (FE) condition, which requires that the sunk entry cost equals the
5The ZPC condition is deﬁned theoretically in the same way in every equilibrium. However, since the
aggregates in each situation are diﬀerent, the entry cutoﬀ will also be diﬀerent.
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present value of expected proﬁts:
1
δ
[∫ ϕ∗XI
ϕ∗D
πD (ϕ) dG (ϕ) +
∫ ∞
ϕ∗XI
πXI (ϕ) dG (ϕ)
]
= fE (14)
uniquely determine the equilibrium price (P ) , the number of ﬁrms (M) and the distribution
of active ﬁrms productivity in the economy along with the productivity cutoﬀs ϕ∗XI and ϕ
∗
D.
See Appendix C for a formal proof.
3.4 Discussion
The ﬁrm productivity distribution varies along the parameter space according to the rela-
tion between trade costs and the relative innovation costs. This is especially relevant for
ﬁrms with an intermediate level of productivity, as their decisions will be most sensitive to
these costs. In particular, in the low cost innovation equilibrium, when trade costs are high
enough, they are domestic innovators. In the low cost trade equilibrium, when trade costs
are low enough in relation to innovation costs, middle productivity ﬁrms will be exporters
and the most productive of them will export and innovate. In between these two equilibria,
there is the intermediate equilibrium, where trade costs are not relatively high enough for
ﬁrms to be domestic innovators nor low enough for ﬁrms to be exporters non-innovators.
That is, middle productivity ﬁrms are either exporter innovators or domestic ﬁrms. These
choices are the ones that determine the parameter restrictions associated to each equili-
brium. Furthermore, notice that the three equilibria cover the whole parameter space, and
therefore the ﬁrm productivity distribution and the eﬀects of opening up to trade of an
economy can be always determined. Table 1 summarizes all the possible equilibria in the
open economy and the parameter restrictions associated to each one.
Furthermore, the model has implications for the aggregate productivity level. Firstly,
trade induces the exit of the less productive ﬁrms and the reallocation of market shares
towards the more productive ﬁrms, raising the industry average productivity in the long
run. This is the selection eﬀect described in Melitz (2003). And secondly, trade has
indirect eﬀects on the average productivity through innovation. Moving from the low cost
innovation equilibrium to the low cost trade equilibrium, the cost of exporting relative
to the cost of innovation decreases, therefore the eﬀect trade has on innovation will be
diﬀerentiated according to the level of transportation costs. On the one hand, there is
an eﬀect through the intensive margin of innovation. The innovation intensity increases
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with the participation in foreign markets and thus, the eﬀect will be larger in the low cost
trade equilibrium where the economy is more open. On the other hand, there is an eﬀect
through the extensive margin of innovation. In Crespo (2011), it is shown that the impact
on average productivity through the extensive margin will be negative in the low cost
innovation equilibrium, undetermined in the intermediate equilibrium and can be positive
in the low cost trade equilibrium. In the empirical analysis we will decompose the change
in productivity due to trade costs into these components and quantify their relevance.
Equilibrium Conditions
Low Cost Innovation
Equilibrium
τσ−1fX ≥
[
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α −1
]
nτ1−σ fI +
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)
&(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) ≥ fD
Intermediate Equilibrium
[
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α −1
]
nτ1−σ fI +
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) ≥ τσ−1fX
&
τσ−1fX ≥
(
fI
α
) α
α+1 (α+1)
(1+nτ1−σ) ≥ fD
Low Cost Trade
Equilibrium
(
fI
α
) α
α+1 (α+1)
(1+nτ1−σ) ≥ τσ−1fX ≥ fD
Table 1: Equilibria in the Open Economy
4 Calibration
I calibrate the model to match a number of salient features of innovation, the ﬁrm size
distribution and international trade in ﬁve European countries, using ﬁrm-level data survey
by the EFIGE project. The sample includes around 3,000 ﬁrms for France, Germany, Italy
and Spain, and more than 2,200 ﬁrms for the United Kingdom. The survey, conducted
during the year 2009, contains both qualitative and quantitative information data on ﬁrms’
characteristics and activities in 2008. The distribution by ﬁrm size for the sample and the
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reference population are shown for each country in Table 2.6
Between Between More
Total10 and 49 50 and 249 than 250
Country S P S P S P S P
France 2,151 32,019 608 7,365 214 1,986 2973 41,370
Germany 1836 52,489 793 16,988 306 3,970 2,935 79,144
Italy 2,447 77,092 429 10,062 145 1,408 3,021 88,562
Spain 2,280 38,116 406 6,241 146 1,010 2,832 45,367
U.K. 1,515 27,187 529 7,794 112 1,758 2,156 36,739
Table 2: Distribution by size, sample (S)/reference population(P)
Parameters common to all countries are taken directly from the empirical literature,
while parameters speciﬁc to each country are calibrated such that particular ﬁrm-level
moments in the model match those moments in the data. Parameters common to all
countries are the elasticity of substitution, the elasticity of innovation, the probability of
ﬁrm exit and the sunk cost of entry. The elasticity of substitution is set to be consistent
with empirical estimates provided by Broda and Weinstein (2006). The medians reported
vary from 2.2 to 4.8 depending on the level of aggregation, thus I set σ = 3.2 which lies
within the estimated range of values. The innovation parameter α is taken to be 0.9. This
is consistent with the estimate of Rubini (2011), who sets the elasticity of productivity
to resources devoted to innovation to match a 5% gain in labor productivity in Canada
following the tariﬀ reduction in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement between 1980 and
1996. The probability of exit and the sunk cost of entry determine the entry and exit of
ﬁrms. Following Bernard et al. (2007) I set them to δ = 0.025 and fE = 2.
Parameters speciﬁc to each country are innovation ﬁxed costs (fI), export ﬁxed costs
(fX), variable trade costs (τ), domestic ﬁxed costs (fD), the productivity distribution, and
the number of trading partners. The ﬁrst four are calibrated jointly to match the number
of workers in innovation, the percentage of exporters innovators in the economy, the ratio
of exports to revenue and the percentage of executives (including entrepreneurs and middle
6The sample design over-represents large ﬁrms, therefore sampling weights have been constructed in
terms of size-sector cells to make the sample representative of the underlying population. The calibration
is based on the weighted sample.
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management) in the labor force. To match the productivity distribution, I target the slope
of the ﬁrm size distribution in terms of employees, and similarly to Helpman et al. (2004)
and Chaney (2008), I assume the productivity is distributed according to a Pareto with a
probability density function
g(ϕ) =
θ
ϕθ+1
where ϕ ∈ [1,∞) and θ is the curvature parameter. In accordance to the model considered,
I estimate by maximum likelihood the curvature parameter associated to the distribution
of ﬁrms, θ˜ = θ/(σ − 1) (α+1α ). Given that the model assumes symmetric country sizes,
the number of a country’s trading partners is determined by the country’s size relative
to the size of the other countries. For example, if the number of employees in Spain is
one-eighth the number of employees in the rest of the countries, we assume Spain has 8
trading partners. The targets are reported in Table 3.
Country Slope Employees Executives Export Exporters R&D
Volume Innovators Workers
France 1.06 2,903,820 17.4% 27.30% 22.82% 6.81%
Germany 1.10 5,565,414 9.3% 19.48% 27.59% 6.16%
Italy 1.43 3,555,052 7.6% 32.81% 27.73% 5.81%
Spain 1.27 2,010,424 9.5% 21.50% 19.89% 4.85%
U.K. 1.01 3,729,340 14.5% 25.84% 24.31% 7.38%
Table 3: Calibration Targets
Several facts stand out in Table 3 that will help us interpret the diﬀerences in the
calibrated parameters and our ﬁndings. There are important diﬀerences in export shares
across countries. While exports make up 33% of revenues for Italian ﬁrms, that ﬁgure drops
to 21.5% in Spain and 19.5% in Germany. Similarly, while 28% of Italian and German ﬁrms
export and innovate, that share drops to 20% in Spain. The diﬀerences in R&D workers
are not as substantial across countries: U.K. is the country that employs most workers in
R&D (7.4%) while Spain is the country that employs least (4.85%). As for the slope of the
distribution of exporting ﬁrms, a higher number indicates a steeper slope, and therefore
a smaller proportion of larger ﬁrms exporting. Consistent with this, in Italy and Spain
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the typical exporter is relatively smaller, whereas in France and the U.K. there are many
large exporting ﬁrms. The percentage of executives and middle management also diﬀers
quite a bit across countries. France and UK appear to have a more horizontal structure
given that the percentage of executives (included entrepreneurs and middle management)
is 17.4% and 14.5% respectively, whereas for Italian ﬁrms it drops to 7.6%, indicating a
more vertical structure. The calibrated parameters for each country are in Table 4.
Country θ n fD τ fX fI Ω = fXτ
σ−1 fEX = nfX
France 4.9 6 0.95 1.88 0.44 5.75 1.76 2.64
Germany 5.1 2 2 1.14 8.4 10.6 11.2 16.8
Italy 6.6 4 1.5 1.19 5.5 6 8.1 22
Spain 5.9 8 2 1.93 4.3 2.55 18.3 34.4
U.K. 4.7 4 1.25 1.68 0.6 8.5 1.88 2.4
Table 4: Calibrated Parameters
Several of these results require some further explanation. First, Germany’s ﬁxed trade
costs are relatively high with respect to other countries such as Spain, in spite of being
a more open economy. This is easily explained by the fact that fX represents the ﬁxed
trade cost paid by export destination. Because Germany’s domestic market is much larger
than Spain’s, our assumption on symmetric countries implies that Germany has 2 trading
partners, compared to 8 in the case of Spain. Therefore, as shown in Table 4, the eﬀective
ﬁxed trade costs of a German exporter is 16.8, while the eﬀective ﬁxed trade costs of a
Spanish exporter is 34.4 labor units. Second, France has a relatively high variable trade
cost, similar to Spain, but this is partly oﬀset by the relatively low ﬁxed export cost. Finally,
in spite of Spanish innovation ﬁxed costs being the lowest, this does not imply higher
innovation. In Spain, exporting is a very expensive activity in comparison to innovation,
which explains why some domestic ﬁrms innovate without exporting. However, those
ﬁrms innovate less intensively than the exporter innovators, so that the overall intensity of
innovation in Spain is lower than in other countries.
The calibration predicts in which of the three equilibria described in the theory is each
of the countries considered. The prediction is in Table 5, each equilibrium is determined
by the openness of the economy and the level of innovation. The openness depends on
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both the ﬁxed and the variable trade cost. The parameter Ω in Table 4 captures their
joint eﬀect, so that a country with a lower Ω is more open. In agreement with the theory,
France and United Kingdom, the most open countries with relatively high innovation, are
in the low cost trade equilibrium. Germany and Italy, which are less open and have average
innovation are in the intermediate equilibrium. Spain, the most closed and least innovative
country of the ﬁve, is in the low cost innovation equilibrium.
Country Predicted Equilibrium
France Low Cost Trade Equilibrium
Germany Intermediate Equilibrium
Italy Intermediate Equilibrium
Spain Low Cost Innovation Equilibrium
U.K. Low Cost Trade Equilibrium
Table 5: Predicted Equilibrium
5 Numerical Results
In the numerical analysis I consider the eﬀect on aggregate productivity and welfare of the
following experiments: a decrease in variable trade costs, a decrease in ﬁxed trade costs,
and a decrease in ﬁxed innovation costs.
The theory previously described predicts that a decrease in variable trade cost can have
a substantial impact on individual ﬁrms’ decisions, and thus on aggregate productivity. In
addition to the direct eﬀects on productivity, it identiﬁes three more channels through
which indirect productivity gains can happen: the selection eﬀect, the extensive margin
of innovation and the intensive margin of innovation. The ﬁrst quantitative exercise fo-
cuses on the decomposition of the change in aggregate productivity into these components
and quantifying their relevance. The second quantitative exercise focuses on the eﬀect of
lowering the ﬁxed costs of trade and innovation on productivity. Much of the literature
has limited its attention to the decrease in variable trade costs. However, in a model with
both trade and innovation, liberalizing trade by lowering ﬁxed costs or by reducing variable
costs may have very diﬀerent results.
The section is structured as follows. First, I deﬁne the aggregate productivity measure
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used in the quantitative exercises, as well as its relation to welfare, following the deﬁnition
of Atkeson and Burstein (2010). Second, I decompose changes in aggregate productivity
following a drop in variable trade costs into its diﬀerent components. Finally, I analyze the
eﬀectiveness of a trade liberalization policy versus the eﬀectiveness of an innovation policy
on aggregate productivity.
5.1 Aggregate Productivity
Assume the economy is in steady-state. To solve for aggregate quantities we deﬁne indices
of aggregate productivity across ﬁrms implied by ﬁrms decisions. The ﬁrst of these, ΨD,
is an index of productivity aggregated across all operating, non-exporting domestic ﬁrms,
excluding their innovation activities:
ΨD =
∫ ϕX
ϕD
ϕσ−1dG(ϕ)
The second, ΨX , is an index of productivity aggregated across all exporting domestic ﬁrms,
excluding their innovation activities:
ΨX =
∫ ∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1dG(ϕ)
The third, ΨI , is an index of the productivity coming exclusively from the innovation
activities. Since in some equilibria there are only exporter innovators, while in others
there are exporter and domestic innovators, ΨI is deﬁned slightly diﬀerently for each of
the equilibria:
ΨLCIEI =
∫ ϕXI
ϕDI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α
α+1)dG(ϕ) +
[
1 + τ (1−σ)
]α+1
α
∫ ∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α
α+1)dG(ϕ)
ΨIEI =
∫ ∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α
α+1)dG(ϕ)
ΨLCTEI =
∫ ∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α
α+1)dG(ϕ)
where the superscripts LCIE, IE and LCTE refer to, respectively, the low cost innovation
equilibrium, the intermediate equilibrium, and the low cost trade equilibrium.
The output per production worker measures aggregate productivity, Ψ, whereas the
output per worker measures welfare, W . Both measures can be expressed as a function of
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the productivity indices previously described:
Ψ =
Q
Lp
=
[
M
(
ΨD +
(
1 + τ1−σ
)
ΨX + F (τ)IΨI
)] 1
σ−1 (15)
W =
Q
L
=
(
σ − 1
σ
)[
M
(
ΨD +
(
1 + τ1−σ
)
ΨX + F (τ)IΨI
)] 1
σ−1 (16)
where I is the minimum level of innovation of an innovating ﬁrm in each equilibrium, and
F (τ) is a function of the variable trade costs diﬀerent in each equilibrium. Appendix D
provides a formal derivation of the aggregate productivity in the diﬀerent equilibria. I
focus on this measure of productivity because it is the measure of productivity that is
relevant for welfare in our model and is similar to the ideal measure of productivity deﬁned
by Atkeson and Burstein (2010), hence making our results comparable.7
5.2 Decomposing the Productivity Eﬀect of a Reduction in Variable
Trade Costs
In this section, I analytically and quantitatively study the impact of a change in marginal
trade costs on the measure of aggregate productivity. Following Atkeson and Burstein
(2010), I do a ﬁrst order approximation of the eﬀect of a reduction in marginal interna-
tional trade costs τ , decomposing its impact on productivity into a direct eﬀect and an
indirect eﬀect. The direct eﬀect takes all ﬁrms’ decisions as given, and simply measures the
productivity gains from trade being less wasteful, whereas the indirect eﬀect arises from
changes in ﬁrms’ entry, export and innovation decisions, which are themselves responding
to the change in trade costs. The following proposition shows the decomposition.
Proposition 4. The total change in productivity from a change in trade costs and be
decomposed into a direct eﬀect and an indirect eﬀect. Moreover, the indirect eﬀect can be
7This measure of aggregate productivity does not necessarily correspond to aggregate productivity as
measured in the data. If all diﬀerentiated products are intermediate goods used in production of ﬁnal goods,
changes in the price level for ﬁnal expenditures can be directly measure using ﬁnal goods and ΔlogΨ is the
variation of measured productivity. If all diﬀerent products are consumed directly as ﬁnal goods, then the
problem of measuring changes in the price level for ﬁnal expenditures is more complicated. See Atkeson
and Burstein (2010) and Bajona et al. (2008) for a discussion of related issues.
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decomposed into an entry eﬀect, a reallocation eﬀect, and an innovation eﬀect.
ΔlogΨ = −sXΔlog(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports
−
(
ΔF (τ)
τ
)
sInnIΔlog(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exporters′ Innovation
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
Direct
Eﬀect
+ 1σ−1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ Δlog(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry Effect
+ sDΔlog (ΨD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic Market
+
(
1 + nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sXΔlog (ΨX)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Export Market
+ sInnIΔlog(I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive Margin
+ sInnIΔlog(ΨI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive Margin
⎤⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Innovation
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
Indirect
Eﬀect
Proof. Since in each equilibria the decisions on innovation are diﬀerent, I use a general syn-
tax to point out the diﬀerent components of the decomposition. The exact equations along
with the full proof are in Appendix D. In what follows, I sketch brieﬂy the mathematics
behind the decomposition 8.
Recall that for every x ∈ R
Δx
x
= Δlog(x)
Take logs of Ψ
Ψ =
1
σ − 1
[
log(M) + log
(
ΨD +
(
1 + τ1−σ
)
ΨX + F (τ)IΨI
)]
And derivatives
ΔlogΨ =
1
σ − 1
[
Δlog(M) + ΔlogΨˆ
]
ΔlogΨˆ =
1
Ψˆ
[
ΔΨD +Δ
(
1 + τ1−σ
)
ΨX +
(
1 + τ1−σ
)
ΔΨX
+ΔF (τ)IΨI + F (τ)ΔIΨI + F (τ)IΔΨI ]
Deﬁne the share of domestic production excluding innovation in the value of production
8This derivation works well only for inﬁnitesimal changes
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sD =
ΨD
Ψˆ
, the share of export production excluding innovation in the value of production
sX =
nτ1−σΨX
Ψˆ
and the share of exporters innovation activities in the value of production
sLCIXI =
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α ΨXI
Ψˆ
and sIE,LCTXI =
(1+nτ1−σ)ΨXI
Ψˆ
.
The purpose of the decomposition is to test the prediction of the theoretical model
and to quantify the importance of the diﬀerent eﬀects. I now discuss each eﬀect, and its
expected theoretical sign. The direct eﬀect takes all ﬁrms’ decisions as given and has two
positive components: the ﬁrst captures the productivity gain of exporters which lose less
output from exporting, and the second captures the additional return from innovation by
exporters that now face lower trade costs. The indirect eﬀect has ﬁve components: the
ﬁrst three correspond to the selection eﬀect described in Melitz (2003), whereas the last
two correspond to the change in innovation. As for the selection eﬀect, the ﬁrst component
corresponds to a drop in trade costs inducing the exit of less productive ﬁrms, implying
the entry eﬀect should be negative. The second and third components have to do with
the reallocation of market shares between the remaining domestic and exporting ﬁrms.
Less productive ﬁrms lose market share to more productive exporting ﬁrms, hence the
domestic indirect eﬀect should be negative and the exporters indirect eﬀect positive. As
for the innovation eﬀect, it can be decomposed into the intensive and extensive margin of
innovation. The innovation intensity increases with the participation in foreign markets
and thus, the eﬀect through the intensive margin of innovation of the exporters innovators
should be positive. For the extensive margin, the theory predicts that the eﬀect can be
positive or negative. In the low cost trade equilibrium and the intermediate equilibrium,
all innovators are exporting. In that case a decrease in iceberg trade costs increases the
incentives to be an exporter (and to be an exporter innovator), so that the eﬀect through the
extensive margin of innovation should be positive. In the low cost innovation equilibrium,
innovation happens by both exporting and domestic ﬁrms. Hence, while a decrease in
iceberg trade costs increases the incentives of exporters to innovate, for the domestic ﬁrms
innovation becomes harder, as real wages are pushed up. This implies that the productivity
cutoﬀ of domestic innovators moves to the right, so that the eﬀect through the extensive
margin of innovation will be negative.
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Table 6 shows the elasticity of each component with respect to a decrease in variable
trade costs in the ﬁve countries. All the elasticities have the predicted signs. A decrease
in iceberg trade costs induces in all countries an increase in total productivity. The direct
eﬀect on exporting through innovation is stronger the more closed the economy is, since
they react more strongly to variations in trade costs. There is a negative eﬀect through
the entry of ﬁrms, and through the loss of market share by domestic ﬁrms, while there is a
positive eﬀect coming from the gain in market share by exporting ﬁrms and the intensive
margin of innovation. Finally, as predicted, the extensive margin of innovation has a
positive eﬀect in the economies that are in the low cost trade equilibrium or intermediate
equilibrium, while it is negative in the low cost innovation equilibrium economies.
Atkeson and Burstein (2010) predict that although a drop in iceberg trade costs changes
individual ﬁrms’ decisions, the total indirect eﬀect is essentially zero. In contrast, my
simulations show that this is not always the case. If the eﬀect through the extensive
margin is small, as in the case of the United Kingdom, then the indirect eﬀect on total
productivity is close to 0, since the response through the intensive margin of innovation
oﬀsets the impact of changes in ﬁrms’ exit. However, if the eﬀect through the extensive
margin is large, as happens in Spain, this is no longer the case, and the indirect eﬀect
substantially diﬀers from zero.
The diﬀerence between Atkeson and Burstein (2010) and my paper is that I have an
extensive margin of innovation. Taking into account the extensive margin is particularly
important in the low cost innovation equilibrium, where the number of total innovators
in the economy decreases after a reduction of trade costs, and therefore the impact on
aggregate productivity is negative. However, in all the equilibria where the impact is
positive, since the number of innovators in the economy increases, the eﬀect through the
extensive margin of innovation is quite small. Consistent with this, I observe that a 1% drop
in trade costs leads to a reduction of 1.84% in innovating ﬁrms in Spain (the only country
in the low cost innovation equilibrium), whereas in Germany the number of innovating
ﬁrms increases only by 0.41%, hence I expect a larger eﬀect through the extensive margin
of innovation in Spain than in Germany.
5.3 Lowering Fixed Costs of Trade and Innovation
The model is particularly suitable to study the eﬀectiveness of trade and innovation policies.
In this section I compare the response of aggregate productivity to a decrease in ﬁxed trade
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costs versus the response to a decrease in ﬁxed innovation costs. While much of the trade
literature focuses on decreases in variable trade costs, evaluating the eﬀect of lowering ﬁxed
costs is also important. This is especially true in model where ﬁrms take both export and
innovation decisions.9
First, I will describe the eﬀects of a drop in ﬁxed trade costs and a drop in ﬁxed
innovation costs on the decisions of the ﬁrms in the economy. Second, I will quantitatively
assess the elasticity of total productivity, and therefore welfare, to ﬁxed costs. Third, I will
analyze the impact on aggregate productivity of a change in the economies’ equilibrium as
a consequence of a large drop in ﬁxed costs.
5.3.1 Eﬀects on ﬁrms’ decisions of a drop in ﬁxed costs
A reduction in ﬁxed trade costs increases the incentives to enter the export market. In the
low cost innovation equilibrium and the intermediate equilibrium this implies that there is
an increase in the ﬁrms that export and innovate. In the low cost trade equilibrium it implies
that more ﬁrms export but that less ﬁrms export and innovate. In this equilibrium, the
ﬁrms choosing whether to innovate or not are already exporting (and therefore are paying
the ﬁxed export costs), so they only care about innovation costs and variable trade costs.
For them a drop in ﬁxed trade costs lowers the incentives to innovate, since it induces
more entry into the industry, reducing the price index and lowering the proﬁts coming
from innovation. In the next proposition I prove this latter result.
Proposition 5. In the low cost trade equilibrium, if ﬁxed trade costs fall
1. The domestic cutoﬀ increases ∂ϕD/∂fX < 0
2. The productivity cutoﬀ for exporting decreases ∂ϕX/∂fX > 0
3. The productivity cutoﬀ for exporting and innovation increases ∂ϕXI/∂fX < 0
Proof. Assume that G(ϕ) = 1 −
(
1
ϕ
)θ
. Diﬀerentiating (Equation B.2) with respect to
fX and using ∂ϕX/∂fX = (ϕX/ϕD) ∂ϕD/∂fX + [1/(σ − 1)]ϕX/fX and ∂ϕXI/∂fX =
(ϕXI/ϕD) ∂ϕD/∂fX from Equation 8, Equation 9 and Equation 10 yields:
9In a pure trade model, without innovation, lowering variable or ﬁxed costs tend to have qualitatively
similar results on welfare. See (Melitz, 2003) for a more comprehensive explanation.
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∂ϕLCTD
∂fX
=
n 1
ϕθX
−nfX
(
σ−1
θ−(σ−1)
)
θ
ϕθX
1
ϕD
− fI
(
(σ−1)(α+1α )
θ−(σ−1)(α+1α )
)
θ
ϕθXI
1
ϕD
< 0
∂ϕLCTX
∂fX
=
1
θfX
−
fI
(
(σ−1)(α+1α )
θ−(σ−1)(α+1α )
)
θ
ϕθ+1XI
ϕXI
ϕX
nfX
(
σ−1
θ−(σ−1)
)
θ
ϕθ+1X
(
ϕX
ϕD
)
∂ϕD
∂fX
> 0
∂ϕLCTXI
∂fX
=
(
ϕXI
ϕD
)
∂ϕD
∂fX
< 0
Similarly, a reduction in ﬁxed innovation costs increases the incentives to start inno-
vating. In the low cost trade equilibrium and the intermediate equilibrium this implies
that there is an increase in the ﬁrms that export and innovate (because all innovators are
exporting). In the low cost innovation equilibrium, it implies that more ﬁrms innovate but
that less ﬁrms export and innovate. A drop in ﬁxed innovation costs lowers the incentives
to export, since it induces more entry into the industry, reducing the price index and the
proﬁts coming from exporting.
5.3.2 Elasticity of total productivity to ﬁxed costs
Table 7 reports the elasticity of aggregate productivity with respect to a reduction in
the ﬁxed costs of trade and innovation, and compares them to the elasticity of aggregate
productivity with respect to a reduction in the marginal trade cost. The aggregate pro-
ductivity of the economy responds much more strongly to a change in marginal trade costs
than to a change in ﬁxed trade costs or ﬁxed innovation costs. While the elasticities with
respect to the ﬁxed costs are both small, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between them.
On the one hand, the elasticity of aggregate productivity with respect to the ﬁxed
innovation costs is very similar across countries and always positive. For countries in the
low cost trade or the intermediate equilibrium, lower ﬁxed innovation costs imply more
ﬁrms exporting and innovating. However, in the low cost innovation equilibrium, which
characterizes Spain, there are two opposing eﬀects. While the cost of innovating has
dropped, there is the negative eﬀect coming from a reduction in the incentives to export,
so that the number of exporters innovators falls. As can be seen from Table 7, the direct
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positive eﬀect more than oﬀsets the negative eﬀect, so that the overall productivity (and
welfare) increases in Spain.
On the other hand, the elasticity of aggregate productivity with respect to ﬁxed trade
costs is in absolute terms greater than the elasticity with respect to ﬁxed innovation costs,
therefore a decrease in ﬁxed trade costs appears to be more eﬀective than a decrease in ﬁxed
innovation costs. However, the response of aggregate productivity to a drop in ﬁxed export
costs is negative in two countries, France and United Kingdom. Both economies are in the
low cost trade equilibrium, and Proposition 5 shows that a reduction in ﬁxed trade costs
increases the incentives to enter the export market, but lowers the incentives to innovate.
The intuition is that the increased presence of foreign ﬁrms pushes up real wages, which
reduces the number of innovators and the intensity of the remaining innovators. Since the
investment in innovation decreases, so do the total revenues (and proﬁts) of these ﬁrms.
Therefore, there is a reallocation of market shares from the most productive ﬁrms in the
economy towards slightly less productive ﬁrms (the new exporters), which lowers the total
productivity of the economy and therefore welfare.
France Germany Italy Spain U.K.
Ψ,τ 0.643 0.642 0.806 0.65 0.597
Ψ,fX -0.0156 0.0124 0.0578 0.0374 -0.0197
Ψ,fI 0.0129 0.0078 0.0155 0.0174 0.0030
Table 7: Eﬀects of a Small Reduction in τ , fX and fI .
5.3.3 Eﬀect on productivity from large changes in ﬁxed costs
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the response of total productivity to larger changes in ﬁxed
trade costs and ﬁxed innovation costs. On the horizontal axes are the ﬁxed costs (in reverse
order, from high to low) and on the vertical axes is the variation in total productivity with
respect to the initial total productivity. An upward-sloping schedule for a given country
implies that total productivity (and therefore also welfare) increases when ﬁxed costs drop.
For each country the starting point is their initial ﬁxed costs, and I only consider decreases.
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Several facts stand out in these two ﬁgures. First, the response of productivity to
changes in ﬁxed trade costs is stronger than the response to changes in ﬁxed innovation
costs. Second, if the economy is in the low cost trade equilibrium, the total productivity
decreases as ﬁxed trade costs decrease. This is the case of France and the UK. Third, if
ﬁxed innovation costs decrease, total productivity increases the most if the economy is the
low cost innovation equilibrium. This the case of Spain. These three facts are similar to
the ones found when computing the elasticities in Table 7.
However, the ﬁgures also reveal that the largest changes in productivity happen when
countries move from one equilibrium to another as a consequence of the drop in ﬁxed
costs. This is especially relevant if the movement from one equilibrium to another has a
big impact on the number of ﬁrms in the economy. These changes in productivity can be
positive or negative, large or small, therefore studying what drives them is important to
be able to asses the eﬀectiveness of innovation policies and trade policies.
If the ﬁxed trade cost drops suﬃciently, Spain goes from the low cost innovation equi-
librium to the intermediate equilibrium. In Figure 5 this change in equilibrium shows up
as a large upward spike. In this transition 8% of the ﬁrms in the economy exit. This
negative eﬀect is more than compensated by an increase of 29% in the productivity of the
economy when ignoring changes on the entry of ﬁrms. The large productivity increase is
due to domestic innovators becoming exporting innovators thanks to the increased ease of
entering the export market.
Similarly, if the ﬁxed cost of innovation drops suﬃciently, Italy and Germany also
change equilibrium, this time in the other direction, from the intermediate equilibrium to
the low cost innovation equilibrium. Once again, this shows up as a large spike in Figure 6.
Since trade becomes relatively more expensive, after the transition there are less exporter
innovators and more ﬁrms enter in the domestic market. The loss through the exporter
innovators dominates the entry of more ﬁrms in the economy, hence the spike down in
both economies during the change. Finally, notice that once in the the low cost innovation
equilibrium, the total productivity starts increasing again.
But there are other shifts in equilibria. For example, if the ﬁxed trade cost drops suﬃ-
ciently, Germany goes from the intermediate equilibrium to the low cost trade equilibrium.
And if the ﬁxed cost of innovation drops suﬃciently, France and United Kingdom go from
the low cost trade equilibrium to the intermediate equilibrium. In all these cases, the change
between equilibria is smooth and only the slopes change. In Figure 5, when Germany tran-
sitions to the low cost trade equilibrium, the trend becomes negative, although there are
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still gains in productivity with respect to the initial productivity since it is now in a more
open economy. The negative eﬀect is consistent with Proposition 5, where a decrease in
ﬁxed trade costs induces losses both through the extensive and the intensive margins of
innovation. Note that France and the United Kingdom, which are already in the low cost
trade equilibrium, display a similar behavior, whereby a drop in ﬁxed trade costs lowers
total productivity. However, since both of them are already in a very export oriented eco-
nomy, there are no gains with respect to the initial productivity, and the decrease translates
in a drop in productivity.
If we turn to the opposite case, going from the low cost trade equilibrium to the in-
termediate equilibrium, as France and United Kingdom do in Figure 6, we see that both
countries react diﬀerently. While there is an increase of total productivity in France with
respect to the initial situation, in the United Kingdom the trend is negative and if ﬁxed
innovation costs are low enough, the total productivity decreases with respect to the ini-
tial situation. The decrease in ﬁxed innovation costs induces ﬁrms to become exporters
innovators, increasing the market shares of these ﬁrms while the most ineﬃcient exit the
economy. While in France the positive eﬀect through the reallocation of market shares
towards the more eﬃcient ﬁrms dominates the negative eﬀect through the exit of ﬁrms, in
the United Kingdom it is the negative eﬀect through the exit of ﬁrms which dominates.
Summarizing, Figure 5 and Figure 6 reveal that a drop in ﬁxed trade costs is more eﬀec-
tive in raising productivity (and welfare) than a drop in ﬁxed innovation costs. Depending
on the country, it can induce productivity gains from 1% to 20% in total, and only if the
economy is already very open might a further drop in ﬁxed trade costs be damaging to the
economy. In contrast, a ﬁxed innovation cost drop has little eﬀect on the productivity, the
maximum increase being around 2%, and if it induces economies to be less export oriented,
then the productivity might decrease by upto 7%.
6 Conclusions
This paper has proposed a trade model with heterogeneous ﬁrms that decide not just
whether or how much to export but also whether or how much to innovate. By incorporat-
ing the extensive and intensive margins of trade and innovation, three equilibria may arise.
In all equilibria high-productivity ﬁrms export and innovate, whereas low-productivity
neither export nor innovate. What diﬀers across equilibria is the behavior of medium-
productivity ﬁrms. In an economy with trade costs that are low relative to innovation costs,
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medium-productivity ﬁrms export without innovating, whereas in an economy with trade
costs that are high relative to innovation costs, medium-productivity ﬁrms innovate with-
out exporting. In a third equilibrium, in between the other two, some medium-productivity
ﬁrms export and innovate, whereas others do neither.
After characterizing these diﬀerent equilibria, we have shown that they are empirically
plausible by calibrating the model to ﬁve European countries. The numerical exercises
reveal the importance of considering both the intensive and extensive margin of innovation
to understand the interdependence between trade and innovation. More generally, the eﬀect
of trade liberalization on productivity and welfare depends crucially on the equilibrium the
economy is in. A standard result in the literature is that the aggregate productivity eﬀect of
a drop in variable trade costs on ﬁrms’ decisions to exit, export and innovate is minimal. In
our setup this is also true in most equilibria, but not in the low cost innovation equilibrium.
In that case a drop in variable trade costs has a negative impact on the extensive margin
of innovation, thus lowering the overall positive eﬀect of trade liberalization.
In addition to analyzing a drop in variable trade costs, I also assessed the impact of
a drop in ﬁxed trade costs and ﬁxed innovation costs. Once again, although in most
equilibria these policies lead to an improvement in aggregate productivity and welfare, this
is not always the case. For example, in the low cost trade equilibrium, a drop in ﬁxed trade
costs increases the number of exporters, making innovating more expensive. This lowers
both the number of innovators and the intensity of innovation, leading to a reduction in
aggregate productivity and welfare.
These ﬁndings stress the importance of having a model that jointly analyzes the ex-
tensive and intensive margins of both trade and innovation. Not doing so would not just
result in a less rich theoretical structure, it would also keep us from correctly assessing the
impact of diﬀerent policies aimed at fomenting trade and innovation.
Of course, this model has abstracted from a number of potentially relevant features
that go beyond the scope of this paper. First, I have exclusively focused on a steady state
environment, thus ignoring the transition dynamics. As shown by Alessandria and Choi
(2011) and Burstein and Melitz (2011), not taking into account transition dynamics may
signiﬁcantly impact the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization. Second, the model does not
consider uncertainty in innovation. While most of the literature on trade and innovation
assumes there is no risk involved,10 the empirical evidence suggests otherwise: there is
10An exception is Atkeson and Burstein (2010) who introduce uncertainty in the outcome of the invest-
ment in process innovation, although ﬁrms always get some returns (no innovation fails).
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risk that an innovator will not identify important needs, that innovation teams disrupt
the regular operations of a business, or that even a promising idea is not accepted by the
customers whose need it was meant to address. Third, I have assumed that there is no
strategic interaction between ﬁrms and therefore the innovation activities of one ﬁrm do
not have any inﬂuence in the innovation activities of the other ﬁrms. The existence of
externalities in process innovation could have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the results. Fourth,
the model could be used to analyze the eﬀect of joint trade and innovation policies. The
right mix of policies could lead to greater gains in aggregate productivity.
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Appendix A - Low Cost Innovation Economy
Productivity distribution and weighted averages
Let us denote by μD (ϕ), μDI (ϕ) and μXI (ϕ) respectively, the productivity distribu-
tion of domestic producers, active innovators and active innovators and exporters prior to
innovation.
μD (ϕ) =
{
g(ϕ)
G(ϕDI)−G(ϕD) , ϕDI > ϕ ≥ ϕD
0 , otherwise
μDI (ϕ) =
{
g(ϕ)
G(ϕXI)−G(ϕDI) , ϕXI ≥ ϕ ≥ ϕDI
0 , otherwise
μXI (ϕ) =
{
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕXI) , ϕ ≥ ϕXI
0 , otherwise
The distributions μD (ϕ), μDI (ϕ) and μXI (ϕ) are not aﬀected by the simultaneous
entry and exit since the successful entrants and failing incumbents draw their productivity
level from the common distribution μ (ϕ) .
Let ϕ˜ =
[∫∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1μ (ϕ) dϕ
] 1
(σ−1)
and ϕ˜X =
[∫∞
ϕXI
ϕσ−1μXI (ϕ) dϕ
] 1
(σ−1)
denote the
average productivity levels of, respectively, all ﬁrms and exporting ﬁrms only prior to
innovation. Then the weighted productivity average that reﬂects the combined market
share of all ﬁrms can be deﬁned as
ϕ˜t =
{
1
Mt
[
Mϕ˜σ−1 + nMX
(
τ−1ϕ˜X
)σ−1]} 1σ−1
And let ϕ˜DI =
[∫∞
ϕDI
(
ϕσ−1
) (α+1)
α μDI (ϕ) dϕ
] α
(α+1)
1
(σ−1)
and ϕ˜XI represent the average
productivity the domestic innovators and exporter innovators get from innovation. Then
the weighted productivity average that reﬂects the combined market share of innovation
can be deﬁned as
ϕ˜It =
{
1
MIt
[
MI (ϕ˜DI)
(σ−1)(α+1α ) +mXI
((
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α − 1
)
(ϕ˜XI)
(σ−1)(α+1α )
]}( αα+1 )( 1σ−1 )
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Aggregate Variables
Denote by mXI ,mDI and mD respectively the mass of active innovators and exporters,
active innovators but non-exporters and non-innovators and non-exporters present in the
economy,
mXI =
1−G (ϕXI)
1−G (ϕD) M
mDI =
G (ϕXI)−G (ϕDI)
1−G (ϕD) M
mD =
G (ϕDI)−G (ϕD)
1−G (ϕD) M
with M being the mass of incumbent ﬁrms in the economy, MI = mDI +mXI the number
of ﬁrms that perform innovation activities and MX = mXI the number of ﬁrms performing
exporting activities. The total number of varieties sold in the economy (by symmetry)
will be Mt = M + nMX , and the total number of varieties coming from innovators will be
M It = MI + nMX .
It can be shown that the aggregates will take the following expressions
  Aggregate Price Index
P 1−σ = Mt [pD (ϕ˜t)]1−σ +M It zD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α [
pD
((
ϕ˜It
)α+1
α
)]1−σ
  Aggregate Production
Qρ = Mt [qD (ϕ˜t)]
ρ +M It zD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α [
qD
((
ϕ˜It
)α+1
α
)]ρ
  Aggregate Revenue
R = MtrD (ϕ˜t) +M
I
t zD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α
rD
((
ϕ˜It
)α+1
α
)
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  Aggregate Proﬁts
Π = Mt
rD (ϕ˜t)
σ
−MfD − nMXfX −MIfI +MIα
(
1
α+ 1
)α+1
α
(
rD (ϕ˜I)
σ
)α+1
α
+mXI
[(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α − 1
]
α
(
1
α+ 1
)α+1
α
(
rD (ϕ˜XI)
σ
)α+1
α
(A.1)
Low Cost Innovation Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 1, part II
If there are suﬃciently high ﬁxed export cost, there exist a single cutoﬀ ϕ∗XI that solves
equation (6)
Proof. The proof is divided in three sections
First, I show that the LHS of equation (6) is positive with respect to the productivity
parameter. πXI (ϕXI)− πDI (ϕXI) ≥ 0[(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α − 1
]
α
(
1
α+1
)α+1
α
[(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1
]α+1
α
+nτ1−σ
(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1−nfx≥ 0
C1
(
ϕσ−1
)α+1
α + C2ϕ
σ−1 − nfx ≥ 0
∂LHS
∂ϕ
= C1
(
α+ 1
α
)
(σ − 1)ϕ(α+1α )(σ−1)−1 + C2 (σ − 1)ϕσ−2 > 0
Secondly, I show that πXI (ϕDI) − πDI (ϕDI) < 0, otherwise the ﬁrm would choose to
export and innovate instead of being indiﬀerent between innovating or not while staying
in the domestic market.
πXI (ϕDI)− πDI (ϕDI) < 0[(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α − 1
]
fI + nτ
1−σ
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)− nfX < 0
Thus, for fX large enough, that is for
fX >
[(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α − 1
]
fI
n
+ τ1−σ
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)
it holds that πXI (ϕDI)− πDI (ϕDI) < 0
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Finally, I show that the diﬀerence between the proﬁts of the exporting and non-
exporting strategies while innovation goes to inﬁnite as the productivity of the ﬁrm is
larger.
If ϕ → ∞,then πXI (zD (ϕ)) − πDI (zD (ϕ)) → ∞, since by deﬁnition πXI (zX (ϕ)) >
πXI (zD (ϕ)) then it must be that πXI (zX (ϕ))− πDI (zD (ϕ)) → ∞ as ϕ → ∞
πXI (zD (ϕ))− πDI (zD (ϕ)) = nτ1−σ [1 + z]
(
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1 − nfX
= nτ1−σ
(
1
α+ 1
) 1
α
[(
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1
]α+1
α
+nτ1−σ
(
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1 − nfX
lim
ϕ→∞ [πXI (zD (ϕ))− πDI (zD (ϕ))] = limϕ→∞
[
C4
[
ϕσ−1
]α+1
α + C5ϕ
σ−1 − C6
]
= lim
ϕ→∞
[
C4
[
ϕσ−1
]α+1
α
]
+ lim
ϕ→∞
[
C5ϕ
σ−1]− lim
ϕ→∞ (C6) → ∞
Proof of Proposition 1, part I
Equations (4) to (6) along with the Free Entry condition (7) completely determine
the equilibrium and the productivity cutoﬀs can be uniquely determined and allow me to
rearrange the FE conveniently for the characterizing of the equilibrium as a function of ϕ∗D
δfE = [1−G (ϕ∗D)]π
δfE = fDj1 (ϕ
∗
D) + nτ
1−σfDj2 (ϕ∗X (ϕ
∗
D))− [1−G (ϕ∗XI)]nfX (A.2)
− [1−G (ϕ∗DI)] fI + α
(
1
α+ 1
)α+1
α
f
α+1
α
D j3 (ϕ
∗
D)
+α
(
1
α+ 1
)α+1
α
fD
α+1
α
[(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α − 1
]
j4 (ϕ
∗
D)
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where j1 (ϕ
∗
D) =
[
(ϕ˜ (ϕ∗D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1 − 1
]
, j2 (ϕ
∗
D) = (ϕ˜x (ϕ
∗
D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1 [1−G (ϕ∗XI)]
j3 (ϕ
∗
D) =
[
(ϕ˜DI (ϕ
∗
D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1
]α+1
α
[1−G (ϕ∗DI)] and
j4 (ϕ
∗
D) =
[
(ϕ˜XI (ϕ
∗
D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1
]α+1
α
[1−G (ϕ∗XI)]
Proof.
Assume the parameter restrictions τσ−1fX ≥
[
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α −1
]
nτ1−σ fI +
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) and(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) ≥ fD hold, then the Low Cost Innovation Equilibrium exists and is unique.
I shall proof that the RHS of equation (A.2) is decreasing in ϕ∗D on the domain (ϕ
∗
D,∞),
so that ϕ∗D is uniquely determined by the intersection of the latter curve with the ﬂat line
δfE in the (ϕ
∗
D,∞) space.
Let k1 (ϕ
∗
D) =
[
(ϕ˜ (ϕ∗D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1 − 1
]
, then
k′1 (ϕ
∗
D) =
g (ϕ∗D)
1−G (ϕ∗D)k1 (ϕ∗D)− (σ − 1) [k1 (ϕ
∗
D) + 1]
ϕ∗D
Similarly, k3 (ϕ
∗
D) =
[
(ϕ˜DI (ϕ
∗
D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1
]α+1
α
, thus
k′3 (ϕ
∗
D) = Λ
1
σ−1
g (ϕ∗I)
1−G (ϕ∗I)
[
k2 (ϕ
∗
D)− Λ
α+1
α
]
−
(
α+ 1
α
)
(σ − 1) k2 (ϕ
∗
D)
ϕ∗D
where
∂ϕ∗DI
∂ϕ∗D
=
[(
fI
α
) α
α+1 (α+1)
fD
] 1
σ−1
= Λ
1
σ−1
Now, deﬁne j1 (ϕ
∗
D) = [1−G (ϕ∗D)] k1 (ϕ∗D) , and j3 (ϕ∗D) = [1−G (ϕ∗DI)] k3 (ϕ∗D) which are
non-negative.
Then the derivative and elasticity of j1 (ϕ
∗
D) and j3 (ϕ
∗
D) are
j′1 (ϕ
∗
D) = −
(σ − 1) [k1 (ϕ∗D) + 1]
ϕ∗D
[1−G (ϕ∗D)] < 0
j′1 (ϕ∗D) · ϕ∗D
j1
(
ϕ∗D
) = − (σ − 1)[1 + 1
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< − (σ − 1)
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and
j′3 (ϕ
∗
D) = −g (ϕ∗DI) Λ
1
σ−1
Λ
α+1
α − θ (α+ 1) (σ − 1) k3 (ϕ
∗
D)
ϕ∗D
[1−G (ϕ∗DI)] < 0
j′3 (ϕ∗D) · ϕ∗D
j3
(
ϕ∗D
) = − g (ϕ∗DI)[
1−G (ϕ∗DI)] Λ
1
σ−1
Λ
α+1
α
k2
(
ϕ∗D
) ϕ∗D − β (σ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< −β (σ − 1)
Thus, j1 (ϕ
∗
D) and j3 (ϕ
∗
D) must be decreasing to zero as ϕ goes to inﬁnite. Furthermore,
it must be that lim
ϕ∗D→0
j1 (ϕ
∗
D) = ∞ since lim
ϕ∗D→0
k1 (ϕ
∗
D) = ∞.and lim
ϕ∗D→0
j3 (ϕ
∗
D) = ∞ since
lim
ϕ∗D→0
k3 (ϕ
∗
D) = ∞
Since j1 (ϕ
∗
D) and j3 (ϕ
∗
D), it follows that j2 (ϕ
∗
D) and j4 (ϕ
∗
D) do also monotonically decrease
from inﬁnite to zero on the (0,∞) parameter space.
Therefore, the RHS of (A.2) is a monotonic decreasing function from inﬁnity to zero
on the space (0,∞) that cuts the FE ﬂat line from above identifying a unique cutoﬀ level
ϕ∗D.
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Appendix B - Low Cost Trade Economy
Productivity distribution and weighted averages
Let us denote by μD (ϕ), μX (ϕ) and μXI (ϕ) respectively, the productivity distribution
of domestic producers, exporters and innovators exporters.
μD (ϕ) =
{
g(ϕ)
G(ϕX)−G(ϕD) , ϕX > ϕ ≥ ϕD
0 , otherwise
μX (ϕ) =
{
g(ϕ)
G(ϕXI)−G(ϕX) , ϕXI ≥ ϕ ≥ ϕX
0 , otherwise
μXI (ϕ) =
{
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕXI) , ϕ ≥ ϕXI
0 , otherwise
The distributions μD (ϕ), μX (ϕ) and μXI (ϕ) are not aﬀected by the simultaneous
entry and exit since the successful entrants and failing incumbents draw their productivity
level from the common distribution μ (ϕ) .
Let ϕ˜ =
[∫∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1μ (ϕ) dϕ
] 1
(σ−1)
and ϕ˜X =
[∫∞
ϕXI
ϕσ−1μXI (ϕ) dϕ
] 1
(σ−1)
denote the
average productivity levels of, respectively, all ﬁrms and exporting ﬁrms only prior to
innovation. Then the weighted productivity average that reﬂects the combined market
share of all ﬁrms can be deﬁned as
ϕ˜t =
{
1
Mt
[
Mϕ˜σ−1 + nMX
(
τ−1ϕ˜X
)σ−1]} 1σ−1
And let ϕ˜XI =
[∫∞
ϕXI
(
ϕσ−1
) (α+1)
α μXI (ϕ) dϕ
] α
(α+1)
1
(σ−1)
represent the average productivity
the innovators get from innovation.
Aggregate Variables
Denote by mXI ,mX and mD respectively the mass of active innovators and exporters,
only exporters and non-innovators non-exporters present in the economy,
mXI =
1−G (ϕXI)
1−G (ϕD) M
mX =
G (ϕXI)−G (ϕX)
1−G (ϕD) M
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mD =
G (ϕX)−G (ϕD)
1−G (ϕD) M
with M being the mass of incumbent ﬁrms in the economy, MI = mXI the number of ﬁrms
that perform innovation activities and MX = mX +mXI the number of ﬁrms performing
exporting activities. The total number of varieties sold in the economy (by symmetry) will
be Mt = M + nMX .
It can be shown that the aggregates will take the following expressions
  Aggregate Price Index
P 1−σ = Mt [pD (ϕ˜t)]
1−σ
+mXI
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
zX (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α
[
pD
(
ϕ˜
(α+1α )
XI
)]1−σ
  Aggregate Production
Qρ = Mt [qD (ϕ˜t)]
ρ +mXI
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
zX (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α [
qD
(
ϕ˜
(α+1α )
XI
)]ρ
  Aggregate Revenue
R = MtrD (ϕ˜t) +mXI
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
zX (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α
rD
(
ϕ˜
(α+1α )
XI
)
  Aggregate Proﬁts
Π = Mt
rD (ϕ˜t)
σ
−MfD − nMXfX −mXIfI (B.1)
+mXI
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
α
(
1
α+ 1
)α+1
α
(
rD (ϕ˜I)
σ
)α+1
α
Low Cost Trade Economy Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 2
Equations (8) to (10) along with the Free Entry condition (11)completely determine the
equilibrium and the productivity cutoﬀs can be uniquely determined and I can rearrange
the FE conveniently for the characterizing of the equilibrium as a function of ϕ∗D
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δfE = [1−G (ϕ∗D)]π
δfE = fDl1 (ϕ
∗
D) + nfX l2 (ϕ
∗
X (ϕ
∗
D)) (B.2)
+α
(
1
α+ 1
)α+1
α [
fD
(
1 + τ1−σ
)](α+1α )
l3 (ϕ
∗
D)− [1−G (ϕ∗XI)] fI
where j1 (ϕ
∗
D) =
[
(ϕ˜ (ϕ∗D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1 − 1
]
, j2 (ϕ
∗
X (ϕ
∗
D)) =
[
(ϕ˜ (ϕ∗X) /ϕ
∗
X)
σ−1 − 1
]
[1−G (ϕ∗X)]
and j3 (ϕ
∗
D) =
[
(ϕ˜XI (ϕ
∗
D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1
](α+1α )
[1−G (ϕ∗XI)]
Proof.
Assume the parameter restriction
(
fI
α
) αα+1
(α+1)
(1+nτ1−σ) ≥ τσ−1fX ≥ fD holds, then the Low Cost
Trade Equilibrium exists and is unique. I shall proof that the RHS of equation (B.2)
is decreasing in ϕ∗D on the domain (ϕ
∗
D,∞), so that ϕ∗D is uniquely determined by the
intersection of the latter curve with the ﬂat line δfE in the (ϕ
∗
D,∞) space.
Let k1 (ϕ
∗
D) =
[
(ϕ˜ (ϕ∗D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1 − 1
]
, then
k′1 (ϕ
∗
D) =
g (ϕ∗D)
1−G (ϕ∗D)k1 (ϕ∗D)− (σ − 1) [k1 (ϕ
∗
D) + 1]
ϕ∗D
Similarly, k3 (ϕ
∗
D) =
[
(ϕ˜DI (ϕ
∗
D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1
]α+1
α
, thus
k′3 (ϕ
∗
D) = Λ
1
σ−1
g (ϕ∗I)
1−G (ϕ∗I)
[
k2 (ϕ
∗
D)− Λ
α+1
α
]
−
(
α+ 1
α
)
(σ − 1) k2 (ϕ
∗
D)
ϕ∗D
where
∂ϕ∗DI
∂ϕ∗D
=
[(
fI
α
) α
α+1 (α+1)
fD
] 1
σ−1
= Λ
1
σ−1
Now, deﬁne j1 (ϕ
∗
D) = [1−G (ϕ∗D)] k1 (ϕ∗D) , and j2 (ϕ∗D) = [1−G (ϕ∗DI)] k2 (ϕ∗D) which are
non-negative.
Then the derivative and elasticity of j1 (ϕ
∗
D) and j3 (ϕ
∗
D) are
j′1 (ϕ
∗
D) = −
(σ − 1) [k1 (ϕ∗D) + 1]
ϕ∗D
[1−G (ϕ∗D)] < 0
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j′1 (ϕ∗D) · ϕ∗D
j1
(
ϕ∗D
) = − (σ − 1)[1 + 1
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< − (σ − 1)
and
j′3 (ϕ
∗
D) = −g (ϕ∗DI) Λ
1
σ−1
Λ
α+1
α − θ (α+ 1) (σ − 1) k3 (ϕ
∗
D)
ϕ∗D
[1−G (ϕ∗DI)] < 0
j′3 (ϕ∗D) · ϕ∗D
j3
(
ϕ∗D
) = − g (ϕ∗DI)[
1−G (ϕ∗DI)] Λ
1
σ−1
Λ
α+1
α
k2
(
ϕ∗D
) ϕ∗D − β (σ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< −β (σ − 1)
Thus, j1 (ϕ
∗
D) and j3 (ϕ
∗
D) must be decreasing to zero as ϕ goes to inﬁnite. Further-
more, it must be that lim
ϕ∗D→0
j1 (ϕ
∗
D) = ∞ since lim
ϕ∗D→0
k1 (ϕ
∗
D) = ∞ and lim
ϕ∗D→0
j3 (ϕ
∗
D) = ∞
since lim
ϕ∗D→0
k3 (ϕ
∗
D) = ∞. Since j1 (ϕ∗D) and j3 (ϕ∗D) are decreasing from inﬁnity to zero on
(0,∞),from the closed economy case, it follows that j2 (ϕ∗X (ϕ∗D)) does also monotonically
decrease from inﬁnite to zero on the (0,∞) parameter space.
Therefore, the RHS of (B.2) is a monotonic decreasing function from inﬁnity to zero
on the space (0,∞) that cuts the FE ﬂat line from above identifying a unique cutoﬀ level
ϕ∗D.
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Appendix C - Intermediate Economy
Productivity distribution and weighted averages
Let us denote by μD (ϕ), and μXI (ϕ) respectively, the productivity distribution of
domestic producers, and active innovators and exporters prior to innovation.
μD (ϕ) =
{
g(ϕ)
G(ϕXI)−G(ϕD) , ϕXI > ϕ ≥ ϕD
0 , otherwise
μXI (ϕ) =
{
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕXI) , ϕ ≥ ϕXI
0 , otherwise
The distributions μD (ϕ), and μXI (ϕ) are not aﬀected by the simultaneous entry and
exit since the successful entrants and failing incumbents draw their productivity level from
the common distribution μ (ϕ) .
Let ϕ˜ =
[∫∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1μ (ϕ) dϕ
] 1
(σ−1)
and ϕ˜X =
[∫∞
ϕXI
ϕσ−1μXI (ϕ) dϕ
] 1
(σ−1)
denote the
average productivity levels of, respectively, all ﬁrms and exporting ﬁrms only prior to
innovation. Then the weighted productivity average that reﬂects the combined market
share of all ﬁrms can be deﬁned as
ϕ˜t =
{
1
Mt
[
Mϕ˜σ−1 + nMX
(
τ−1ϕ˜X
)σ−1]} 1σ−1
And let ϕ˜XI =
[∫∞
ϕXI
(
ϕσ−1
) (α+1)
α μDI (ϕ) dϕ
] α
(α+1)
1
(σ−1)
represent the average productivity
exporter innovators get from innovation.
Aggregate Variables
Denote by mXI and mD respectively the mass of active innovators and exporters, and
non-innovators and non-exporters present in the economy,
mXI =
1−G (ϕXI)
1−G (ϕD) M
mDI =
G (ϕXI)−G (ϕDI)
1−G (ϕD) M
mD =
G (ϕDI)−G (ϕD)
1−G (ϕD) M
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with M being the mass of incumbent ﬁrms in the economy, MI = mXI the number of
ﬁrms that perform innovation activities and MX = mXI the number of ﬁrms performing
exporting activities. The total number of varieties sold in the economy (by symmetry) will
be Mt = M + nMX .
It can be shown that the aggregates will take the following expressions
  Aggregate Price Index
P 1−σ = Mt [pD (ϕ˜t)]1−σ+MIzD (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α (
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α
[
pD
((
ϕ˜It
)α+1
α
)]1−σ
  Aggregate Production
Qρ = Mt [qD (ϕ˜t)]
ρ +MIzD (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α (
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α
[
qD
((
ϕ˜It
)α+1
α
)]ρ
  Aggregate Revenue
R = MtrD (ϕ˜t) +MIzD (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α (
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α rD
((
ϕ˜It
)α+1
α
)
  Aggregate Proﬁts
Π = Mt
rD (ϕ˜t)
σ
−MfD − nMXfX −MIfI
+MI
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α α
(
1
α+ 1
)α+1
α
(
rD (ϕ˜XI)
σ
)α+1
α
(C.1)
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Intermediate Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 3, part II
There exist a single cutoﬀ ϕ∗XI that solves equation (10)
Proof. The proof is divided in three sections
First, I show that the LHS of equation (10) is positive with respect to the productivity
parameter. πXI (ϕXI)− πD (ϕXI) ≥ 0
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α α
(
1
α+1
)α+1
α
[(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1
]α+1
α
+nτ1−σ
(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1−nfX−nfI≥ 0
C1
(
ϕσ−1
)α+1
α + C2ϕ
σ−1 − nfX − fI ≥ 0
∂LHS
∂ϕ
= C1
(
α+ 1
α
)
(σ − 1)ϕ(α+1α )(σ−1)−1 + C2 (σ − 1)ϕσ−2 > 0
Secondly, I show that πXI (ϕD) − πD (ϕD) < 0, otherwise the ﬁrm would choose to
export and innovate instead of being indiﬀerent between innovating or not while staying
in the domestic market.
πXI (ϕD)− πD (ϕD) < 0(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α α
(
fD
α+ 1
) α
α+1
+ nτ1−σfD − nfX − fI < 0
It holds that πXI (ϕD)− πD (ϕD) < 0 if:
τσ−1fX > +
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)
(1 + nτ1−σ)(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) +
[(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α − 1
]
nτ1−σ
fI > τ
σ−1fX
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Proof of Proposition 3, part I
Equations (9) to (10) along with the Free Entry condition (11) completely determine
the equilibrium and the productivity cutoﬀs can be uniquely determined and allow me to
rearrange the FE conveniently for the characterizing of the equilibrium as a function of ϕ∗D
δfE = [1−G (ϕ∗D)]π
δfE = fDj1 (ϕ
∗
D) + nτ
1−σfDj2 (ϕ∗X (ϕ
∗
D))− [1−G (ϕ∗XI)]nfX (C.2)
+α
(
fD
α+ 1
)α+1
α (
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α j3 (ϕ
∗
D)− [1−G (ϕ∗XI)] fI
where j1 (ϕ
∗
D) =
[
(ϕ˜ (ϕ∗D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1 − 1
]
, j2 (ϕ
∗
D) = (ϕ˜x (ϕ
∗
D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1 [1−G (ϕ∗XI)]
and j3 (ϕ
∗
D) =
[
(ϕ˜XI (ϕ
∗
D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1
]α+1
α
[1−G (ϕ∗XI)]
Proof.
Assume the parameter restrictions
[
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α −1
]
nτ1−σ fI +
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) > τσ−1fX and(
fI
α
) α
α+1 (α+1)
(1+nτ1−σ) > τ
σ−1fX hold, then the Intermediate Equilibrium exists and is unique. I
shall proof that the RHS of equation (C.2) is decreasing in ϕ∗D on the domain (ϕ
∗
D,∞),
so that ϕ∗D is uniquely determined by the intersection of the latter curve with the ﬂat line
δfE in the (ϕ
∗
D,∞) space.
Let k1 (ϕ
∗
D) =
[
(ϕ˜ (ϕ∗D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1 − 1
]
,and k2 (ϕ
∗
D) = (ϕ˜X (ϕ
∗
X) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1 , then
k′1 (ϕ
∗
D) =
g (ϕ∗D)
1−G (ϕ∗D)k1 (ϕ∗D)− (σ − 1) [k1 (ϕ
∗
D) + 1]
ϕ∗D
k′2 (ϕ
∗
D) =
g (ϕ∗XI)
1−G (ϕ∗XI)
[
k2 (ϕ
∗
D)−
(
ϕXI
ϕD
)σ−1]
− (σ − 1) k2 (ϕ
∗
D)
ϕ∗D
Similarly, k3 (ϕ
∗
D) =
[
(ϕ˜XI (ϕ
∗
D) /ϕ
∗
D)
σ−1
]α+1
α
, thus
k′3 (ϕ
∗
D) =
g (ϕ∗XI)
1−G (ϕ∗XI)
⎡⎣k3 (ϕ∗D)−
(
ϕσ−1XI
ϕσ−1D
)α+1
α
⎤⎦ ∂ϕ∗XI
∂ϕ∗D
−
(
α+ 1
α
)
(σ − 1) k3 (ϕ
∗
D)
ϕ∗D
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Now, deﬁne j1 (ϕ
∗
D) = [1−G (ϕ∗D)] k1 (ϕ∗D) , and j2 (ϕ∗D) = [1−G (ϕ∗XI)] k2 (ϕ∗D) and
j3 (ϕ
∗
D) = [1−G (ϕ∗XI)] k3 (ϕ∗D) which are non-negative.
Then the derivative and elasticity of j1 (ϕ
∗
D),j2 (ϕ
∗
D) and j3 (ϕ
∗
D) are
j′1 (ϕ∗D) · ϕ∗D
j1
(
ϕ∗D
) = − (σ − 1)[1 + 1
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< − (σ − 1)
j′2 (ϕ∗D) · ϕ∗D
j2
(
ϕ∗D
) = g(ϕXI)
1−G(ϕXI)
(
ϕXI
ϕD
)σ−1
∂ϕXI
∂ϕD
k2
(
ϕ∗D
) − (σ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< − (σ − 1)
j′3 (ϕ∗D) · ϕ∗D
j3
(
ϕ∗D
) = − g (ϕ∗DI)[
1−G (ϕ∗DI)] Λ
1
σ−1
Λ
α+1
α
k2
(
ϕ∗D
) ϕ∗D − β (σ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< −β (σ − 1)
Thus, j1 (ϕ
∗
D), j2 (ϕ
∗
D) and j3 (ϕ
∗
D) must be decreasing to zero as ϕ goes to inﬁnite. Fur-
thermore, it must be that lim
ϕ∗D→0
j1 (ϕ
∗
D) = ∞ since lim
ϕ∗D→0
k1 (ϕ
∗
D) = ∞, lim
ϕ∗D→0
j2 (ϕ
∗
D) = ∞
since lim
ϕ∗D→0
k2 (ϕ
∗
D) = ∞ & lim
ϕ∗D→0
j3 (ϕ
∗
D) = ∞ since lim
ϕ∗D→0
k3 (ϕ
∗
D) = ∞. Then j1 (ϕ∗D),
j2 (ϕ
∗
D) and j3 (ϕ
∗
D), monotonically decrease from inﬁnite to zero on the (0,∞) parameter
space.
Therefore, the RHS of (C.2) is a monotonic decreasing function from inﬁnity to zero
on the space (0,∞) that cuts the FE ﬂat line from above identifying a unique cutoﬀ level
ϕ∗D.
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Appendix D - Aggregates
Aggregate Productivity
In what follows I show that the output of the economy can be expressed as a function of
the number of workers in the economy, their productivity and the elasticity of substitution
and that equation (15) is the general form of such expression in the open economy. For the
proof we use the facts that in equilibrium L = R, that the budget constraint is PQ = R
and the price rule given by equation (2).
Low Cost Innovation Equilibrium
R = MtrD (ϕ˜t) +M
I
t zD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α
rD
((
ϕ˜It
)α+1
α
)
= M
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
QP σ
{∫ ∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1μ(ϕ)dϕ+ nτ1−σ
∫ ∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1μ(ϕ)dϕ
+ zD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α ∫ ϕXI
ϕDI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )μ(ϕ)dϕ
+ zD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α (
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α
∫ ∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )μ(ϕ)dϕ
⎫⎬⎭
Then,
L =
(
σ
σ − 1
)
QM
1
1−σ
{∫ ∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1μ(ϕ)dϕ+ nτ1−σ
∫ ∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1μ(ϕ)dϕ
+ zD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α ∫ ϕXI
ϕDI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )μ(ϕ)dϕ
+ zD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α (
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α
∫ ∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )μ(ϕ)dϕ
⎫⎬⎭
1
1−σ
And
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Q =
(
σ − 1
σ
)[
M
(
ΨD +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΨX + I
LCI
(
ΨDI +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α ΨXI
))] 1
σ−1
L
(D.1)
where ILCI = zD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α
, ΨD =
∫ ϕXI
ϕD
ϕ(σ−1)μ(ϕ)dϕ, ΨX =
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)μ(ϕ)dϕ,
ΨDI =
∫ ϕXI
ϕDI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )μ(ϕ)dϕ and ΨXI =
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )μ(ϕ)dϕ
Intermediate Equilibrium
R = MtrD (ϕ˜t) +mXI
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
zX (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α
rD
(
(ϕ˜XI)
α+1
α
)
= M
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
QP σ
{∫ ∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1μ(ϕ)dϕ+ nτ1−σ
∫ ∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1μ(ϕ)dϕ
+ zX (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α (
1 + nτ1−σ
) ∫ ∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )μ(ϕ)dϕ
⎫⎬⎭
Then,
L =
(
σ
σ − 1
)
QM
1
1−σ
{∫ ∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1μ(ϕ)dϕ+ nτ1−σ
∫ ∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1μ(ϕ)dϕ
+ zX (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α (
1 + τ1−σ
) ∫ ∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )μ(ϕ)dϕ
⎫⎬⎭
1
1−σ
And
Q =
(
σ − 1
σ
)[
M
(
ΨD +
(
1 + nτ (1−σ)
)
ΨX + I
IE
(
1 + τ1−σ
)
ΨXI
)] 1
σ−1
L (D.2)
where IIE = zX (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α
, ΨD =
∫ ϕXI
ϕD
ϕ(σ−1)μ(ϕ)dϕ, ΨX =
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)μ(ϕ)dϕ and
ΨXI =
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )μ(ϕ)dϕ
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Low Cost Trade Equilibrium
R = MtrD (ϕ˜t) +mXI
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
zX(ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α
rD
(
ϕ˜
(α+1α )
XI
)
= M
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
QP σ
{∫ ∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1μ(ϕ)dϕ+ nτ1−σ
∫ ∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1μ(ϕ)dϕ
+
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
zX(ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α ∫ ∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )μ(ϕ)dϕ
⎫⎬⎭
Then,
L =
(
σ
σ − 1
)
QM
1
1−σ
{∫ ∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1μ(ϕ)dϕ+ nτ1−σ
∫ ∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1μ(ϕ)dϕ
+
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
zX(ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α ∫ ∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )μ(ϕ)dϕ
⎫⎬⎭
1
1−σ
And
Q =
(
σ − 1
σ
)[
M
(
ΨD + (1 + nτ
1−σ)ΨX + ILCT
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΨXI
)] 1
σ−1 L (D.3)
where ILCT = zX(ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α
,ΨD =
∫ ϕX
ϕD
ϕ(σ−1)μ(ϕ)dϕ, ΨX =
∫∞
ϕX
ϕ(σ−1)μ(ϕ)dϕ and
ΨXI =
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )μ(ϕ)dϕ
Proof of Proposition 4
Low Cost Innovation Equilibrium
ΨLCI =
[
M
(
ΨD +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΨX + I
LCI
(
ΨDI +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α ΨXI
))] 1
σ−1
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ΔlogΨLCI = −sXΔlog(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports
−
(
α+ 1
α
)(
nτ1−σ
1 + nτ1−σ
)
sXII
LCIΔlog(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exporters′ Innovation
+
1
σ − 1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ Δlog(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry Effect
+ sDΔlog (ΨD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic Market
+
(
1 + nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sXΔlog (ΨX)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Export Market
+ sII
LCIΔlog(ILCI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive Margin
+ ILCI [(sI − sXI)Δlog(ΨDI)Δ + sXI log(ΨXI)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive Margin
⎤⎥⎦
Proof. Recall that for every x ∈ R
Δx
x
= Δlog(x)
Take logs of ΨLCI
log
(
ΨLCI
)
= 1σ−1
[
log(M) + log
(
ΨD +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΨX + I
LCI
(
ΨDI +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α ΨXI
))]
And derivatives
ΔlogΨ =
1
σ − 1
[
Δlog(M) + ΔlogΨˆ
]
ΔlogΨˆ =
1
Ψˆ
[
ΔΨD +Δ
(
1 + τ1−σ
)
ΨX +
(
1 + τ1−σ
)
ΔΨX
+ Δ
[(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α
]
IΨI +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α ΔIΨI +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)α+1
α IΔΨI
]
Deﬁne the share of domestic ﬁrms excluding innovation sD =
ΨD
Ψˆ
, the share of export ﬁrms
excluding innovation sX =
nτ1−σΨX
Ψˆ
, the share of innovation activities sI =
ΨINN
Ψˆ
and the
share of exporters innovation activities sXI =
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α ΨXI
Ψˆ
. Then, the variation in
productivity can be decomposed in the following terms:
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  Direct Eﬀect on Exports = −sXΔlog(τ)
  Direct Eﬀect on Exporters’ Innovation = − (α+1α ) ( nτ1−σ1+nτ1−σ) sXIILCIΔlog(τ)
  Indirect Entry Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)
Δlog(M)
  Indirect Domestic Market Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sDΔlog (ΨD)
  Indirect Export Market Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)(
1+nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sXΔlog (ΨX)
  Indirect Extensive Margin Innovation Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sII
LCIΔlog(ILCI)
  Indirect Intensive Margin Innovation Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)
ILCI (sI − sXI)Δlog(ΨDI) +
(
1
σ−1
)
ILCIsXIΔlog
Intermediate Equilibrium
ΨIE =
[
M
(
ΨD +
(
1 + nτ (1−σ)
)
ΨX + I
IE
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΨXI
)] 1
σ−1
ΔlogΨIE = −sXΔlog(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports
−
(
nτ1−σ
1 + nτ1−σ
)
sXII
IEΔlog(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exporters′ Innovation
+
1
σ − 1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ Δlog(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry Effect
+ sDΔlog (ΨD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic Market
+
(
1 + nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sXΔlog (ΨX)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Export Market
+ sXII
IEΔlog(IIE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive Margin
+ IIEsXI log(ΨI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive Margin
⎤⎥⎦
Proof. Recall that for every x ∈ R
Δx
x
= Δlog(x)
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Take logs of ΨIE
log
(
ΨIE
)
=
1
σ − 1
[
log(M) + log
(
ΨD +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΨX + I
IE
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΨI
)]
And derivatives
ΔlogΨ =
1
σ − 1
[
Δlog(M) + ΔlogΨˆ
]
ΔlogΨˆ =
1
Ψˆ
[
ΔΨD +Δ
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΨX +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΔΨX
+ Δ
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
IΨI +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΔIΨI +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
IΔΨI
]
Deﬁne the share of domestic ﬁrms excluding innovation sD =
ΨD
Ψˆ
, the share of export
ﬁrms excluding innovation sX =
nτ1−σΨX
Ψˆ
and the share of exporters innovation activities
sXI =
(1+nτ1−σ)ΨI
Ψˆ
. Then, the variation in productivity can be decomposed in the following
terms:
  Direct Eﬀect on Exports = −sXΔlog(τ)
  Direct Eﬀect on Exporters’ Innovation = −
(
nτ1−σ
1+nτ1−σ
)
sXII
IEΔlog(τ)
  Indirect Entry Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)
Δlog(M)
  Indirect Domestic Market Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sDΔlog (ΨD)
  Indirect Export Market Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)(
1+nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sXΔlog (ΨX)
  Indirect Extensive Margin Innovation Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sXII
IEΔlog(IIE)
  Indirect Intensive Margin Innovation Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sXII
IEΔlog(ΨXI)
Low Cost Trade Equilibrium
ΨLCT =
[
M
(
ΨD + (1 + nτ
1−σ)ΨX + ILCT
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΨXI
)] 1
σ−1
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ΔlogΨLCT = −sXΔlog(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports
−sXIILCTΔlog(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exporters′ Innovation
+
1
σ − 1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ Δlog(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry Effect
+ sDΔlog (ΨD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic Market
+
(
1 + nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sXΔlog (ΨX)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Export Market
+
(
1 + nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sXII
LCTΔlog(ILCT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive Margin
+
(
1 + nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sXII
LCT log(ΨI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive Margin
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
Proof. Recall that for every x ∈ R
Δx
x
= Δlog(x)
Take logs of ΨLCT
log
(
ΨLCT
)
=
1
σ − 1
[
log(M) + log
(
ΨD +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΨX + I
LCT
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΨI
)]
And derivatives
ΔlogΨ =
1
σ − 1
[
Δlog(M) + ΔlogΨˆ
]
ΔlogΨˆ =
1
Ψˆ
[
ΔΨD +Δ
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΨX +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΔΨX
+ Δ
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
IΨI +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
ΔIΨI +
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
IΔΨI
]
Deﬁne the share of domestic ﬁrms excluding innovation sD =
ΨD
Ψˆ
, the share of export ﬁrms
excluding innovation sX =
nτ1−σΨX
Ψˆ
and the share of exporters innovation activities sXI =
(1+nτ1−σ)ΨXI
Ψˆ
. Then, the variation in productivity can be decomposed in the following
terms:
  Direct Eﬀect on Exports = −sXΔlog(τ)
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  Direct Eﬀect on Exporters’ Innovation = −
(
nτ1−σ
1+nτ1−σ
)
sXII
LCTΔlog(τ)
  Indirect Entry Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)
Δlog(M)
  Indirect Domestic Market Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sDΔlog (ΨD)
  Indirect Export Market Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)(
1+nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sXΔlog (ΨX)
  Indirect Extensive Margin Innovation Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sXII
LCTΔlog(ILCT )
  Indirect Intensive Margin Innovation Eﬀect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sXII
LCTΔlog(ΨXI)
62
